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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This study is about local leadership and the contemporary role of 
mayors in New Zealand.  In particular, the focus is the 
implications of the legally undefined role of the mayor for the 
exercise of local leadership, especially as mayors are elected on 
the assumption that they will lead their councils – and their 
communities.  The research project set out to determine common 
factors that inhibit and enhance leadership and governance. The 
purpose was to analyse whether functional clarification for mayors 
would provide an effective foundation to counter disharmony and 
political disturbance and enable mayors to provide more effective 
local leadership and enhance local governance, today and for 
tomorrow. 
 
 
The emphasis was the 1990s - coinciding with the author’s 
personal experience as the elected three-term Mayor of Hamilton 
(1989-1998), and following the major 1989 local government 
legislative reforms. ‘Troubles’ within the City Halls of the nation, 
and the impact discord was having on local governance and 
community expectations, were of increasing concern. Significantly 
in 2000 the Minister of Local Government sacked the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
dysfunctional Rodney District Council. This report reviews this 
event and its influence on the development of the new Local 
Government Act - enacted in December 2002 – together with the 
emerging expectations that the role of elected members would be 
an issue.    
 
The methodology included an extensive questionnaire to all 
incumbent mayors of 1998-2001, the three-year term of office that 
immediately followed the author’s retirement. A 60 per cent 
response rate was achieved. The tradition and convention 
associated with the leadership position of the mayor is fragile and 
at risk of obstruction and denial in the council leaders’ tug of war. 
The functioning of the mayoral office in the primus inter pares 
council environment is dependent on a set of interlaced and 
interactive factors, and in particular on relationships with 
councillors and the CEO.   
 
The origins of the mayoral office and its traditional role and 
authority were reviewed, along with the development of local 
government in New Zealand.  Literature on leadership was mined, 
to determine whether contemporary discourse had relevance to the 
local leader focus.  There is a paucity of writings on the mayoral 
position. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In the study, local leadership as it relates to the office of the mayor 
and the functions of the position, is defined as an intertwining of 
the community role (representation), the council political executive 
role (as presiding member), and the policy role (relating to council 
decision-making).  The report concludes that a combination of 
rational-legal protections – a sound basis in law and in tandem 
with the provisions for CEOs – could provide a stable everyday 
authority foundation for leadership to ‘rise to the occasion’, 
enabling effective governance. A draft clause prescribing the role 
and functions of the mayoralty is presented. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
PREFACE 
AND 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
The 1990s were a turbulent period for the local government sector 
in New Zealand, as mayors and councils across the country got to 
grips with the new relationship with council chief executives and 
community participatory requirements stemming from the 1989 
reforms.  
 
It was a period of great challenge for me personally since I was the 
elected Mayor of Hamilton (1989-98) and national council 
member of LGNZ (Local Government New Zealand), with 
increasing international involvement through ICLEI (International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) and CHEC 
(Commonwealth Human Ecology Council).  
 
As former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (2003) said in 
describing Britain’s contemporary political culture: 
Politics has lost the capacity for dispassionate, rational 
discussion of issues.  In its place we have a destructive 
preoccupation with personalities and a rhetoric of debate that 
seeks to sensationalise and, therefore, exaggerates conflict 
rather than seeks consensus. 
 
Ordinary people do not infect their everyday conversations 
with the aggressive tone and challenging mood that is 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
commonplace in modern politics. It has become a barrier 
between Parliament and the public because decent people 
simply do not talk to one another in the way that MPs 
address one another in Parliament.  And the mass media is 
part of that destructive, sensationalising culture (NZ Herald, 
24 July 2003, p A19). 
 
 
Former New York Mayor Rudy Guiliani, in his 2002 ‘Leadership’ 
memoirs, confirms a similar culture of abuse both inside City Hall 
and in public ‘town hall meetings’ (Guiliani, 2002, p 246). 
 
I encountered the same culture in New Zealand local government.  
 
Following my retirement as mayor in 1998, and aware that the 
Government planned further legislative reform for the sector, I was 
motivated to undertake this research project in the belief that the 
relationship between good governance, leadership, and the role of 
the mayor held potential to influence culture change. 
 
To again quote Guiliani: 
        There’s no book that tells you how to be mayor (p 56). 
 
 
There is no school for mayors either – as LGNZ President Basil 
Morrison noted at a workshop for new mayors in 2001. 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Guiliani’s desk sign - ‘I’m responsible’ (p 69) – summarises the 
notional job description that I accepted with the mayoral position 
in New Zealand.  And the challenges facing New Zealand mayors 
conform to a global pattern. Preparatory to the 1996 Instanbul 
United Nations Human Settlements Summit, an international 
survey of mayors demonstrated that, despite national differences, 
urban problems were the same worldwide, with the most severe 
priorities as follows: 
Unemployment, inadequate housing, insufficient solid waste 
management, violence and personal insecurity, urban 
poverty, inadequate sanitation, air pollution, lack of public 
transport, inadequate water supply, inadequate social services 
(health, education), and insufficient participation and 
discrimination (by and towards ethnic, women, poor 
communities (The Urban Age, 1996). 
 
 
 
I wish to record my thanks for the support and valued guidance 
given me by my supervisors Drs Priya Kurian, Patrick Barrett, and 
Ann Sullivan, and by Professor Dov Bing, in particular for 
ensuring my blockbuster tendencies became channelled to meet 
academic requirements.   
 
I also acknowledge Local Government New Zealand and the 
Wellington staff for their ongoing interest and support, the 
encouragement given to me by President Basil Morrison 
(Hauraki’s mayor), and the opportunity for dialogue with him and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
colleague mayors such as Waitakere’s Bob Harvey and former 
mayors Angus Macdonald (Waikato) and Alasdair Thompson 
(Coromandel-Thames Valley).  LGNZ’s Dame Catherine Tizard 
scholarship provided me with supporting funds, and an additional 
sense of responsibility to produce an investment return to the local 
government sector.  Hamilton City Council’s CEO Tony Marryatt 
and staff members Margaret Southgate, Gina Krystman, Michael 
Hall and Anthony Dick, as well as City Solicitor Deryck Walter, 
all provided assistance during the course of my research, and I 
thank them.  
 
Internationally, I would like to acknowledge my ICLEI colleagues 
Honolulu Mayor Jeremy Harris and Miami-Dade County Clerk 
Harvey Ruvin, as well as Brisbane Mayor Jim Soorley, who 
assisted me with their experience as well as relevant 
documentation.  ICLEI’s leaders including President Kaarin 
Taipale and founder Jeb Brugmann, the New Zealand-born 
founder of CHEC Zena Daysh (the daughter of a New Plymouth 
mayor), and the many international mayors whose company I have 
kept such as Johannesburg’s Amos Masondo, exemplified for me 
the elusive rich spirit of leadership.  
 
As a mature student entering university studies, I am indebted to 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
my support team of family and friends, in particular Dr Bill 
McArthur whose own extensive academic experience illuminated 
my journey, as well as Pirihira Kaio, my former city council and 
regional council colleague who signposted my government policy 
inquiries from the Office of Local Government Minister Sandra 
Lee, and my neighbour Dr Caroline Steemson who proof-read my 
copy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CONTEXT, FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
My research is about local leadership and the contemporary role of 
mayors in New Zealand.  In particular, my focus is the 
implications of the legally undefined role of the mayor for the 
exercise of local leadership, especially as mayors are elected on 
the assumption that they will lead their councils – and their 
communities.   
 
Local leadership, as it relates to the office of the mayor and the 
functions of the position, is an intertwining of the community role 
(representation), the council political executive role (as presiding 
member), and the policy role (relating to council decision-making).   
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether functional 
clarification would ‘enable’ mayors to provide more effective local 
leadership, and enhance local governance, today and for tomorrow.   
 
This study has involved: 
   Interviews with a sample of mayors to elicit their views on 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
how they understand their roles, their experience of limitations to 
their exercising of leadership, and difficulties arising from the lack 
of legislative prescription. 
 An account of the history of local government to 
contextualise the role of the mayor, and their situation. 
 A review of leadership literature to determine whether 
contemporary discourse on leader characteristics, situational 
influences, and authority had relevance to my local leader focus. 
 
Research Influences 
My personal knowledge of local government spans more than 30 
years, reflecting my involvement initially as a civic affairs 
newspaper reporter from 1965, then as an elected councillor from 
1974, and as a three-term mayor from1989-98.1 
 
My personal experience as the mayor of Hamilton has clearly 
influenced my research.  As Locke, Spirduso and Silverman have 
said, personal experience “brings significant personal baggage to 
the tasks of inquiry” (Locke, Spirduso & Silverman, 1987, p 93).  
Yet this is not necessarily a problem. Indeed “coming clean” can 
well mean “the creation of awareness, not the divestiture of self” 
(ibid). 
    
  
                              
 
                                                                   
My motivation in undertaking the project reflects the importance I 
give to the role of the mayor, and my awareness that this is not a 
unique view. As Australian local government President John Ross 
says, community response to the challenging times in which we 
live is guided by local leaders who have “a significant role to play 
in building a civil society” (Ross, 2002-A, p 1). Commending 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to Kuta Beach, Bali 
in the aftermath of the 2002 terrorist nightclub bombing, Ross 
went on to talk of the role of mayors:     
When disasters strike our shores – whether they take the 
form of bushfires, earthquakes or mass murder – it is often 
local government leaders that step up to the plate (Ross, 
2002-B, p 1). 
 
 
My ‘baggage’ has influenced my research theme, my timetable, 
and my focus on the mayoral ‘Class of 1998-2001’ – the 74 
mayors elected to office for the three-year term immediately 
following my retirement, and therefore at arms’ length from my 
direct experience.  The prospect of further legislative reform added 
interest, timeliness and significance.  The historic sacking of 
Rodney District Council by the Minister of Local Government in 
April 2000, which occurred just as my research programme began, 
was a further influencing factor.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In my view, there are increasing community expectations of the 
office of mayor at a time of eroding council convention and 
tradition related to the position (and person), and this was a further 
influencing factor.  The issue of role clarity arose within the local 
government sector and among mayors during the 1990s. Rodney 
drew further attention to the issue of council disharmony and 
conflict, and the mayoral leadership function.   
 
My personal practitioner experience of the mayoral role provides 
background information and insights not available to non-
practitioner researchers. However, my methodology bridges the 
subjective with the objective requirements of scholarly research. 
This is largely uncharted and undocumented territory, and my 
research framework – with its tailored questionnaire - recognises 
mayors as the primary empirical resource.  Offering practitioners 
an opportunity to ‘tell it as it is’, was to provide a strong 
foundation for theoretical review and thesis development.  
 
The Situation 
During my time, troubles (my expression) within the City Halls of 
the nation, and the impact discord was having on local governance 
and community expectations, were of increasing concern (Stigley, 
1997, p 2). Relationship difficulties between mayors and chief 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
executives was replaced on mayoral chat agendas by discussions 
about trouble-making councillors and how mayors could and 
should operate in war zones.  As Local Government New Zealand 
President Basil Morrison says: “There is no school for mayors” 
(Mayors’ Workshop, 2001, www.localgovt.co.nz). LGNZ has 
organized post-election workshops for new mayors since 1995, but 
as the local government umbrella organisation, it represents 
councils rather than mayors (or councillors). In my time, mayors – 
myself included – crafted personal styles and processes in response 
to the situations and environments in which they found themselves, 
not always successfully, and based on their interpretation of the 
purpose of local government. They defined for themselves the 
functions of local leadership. And they talked among themselves, 
creating informal support networks to share concerns and seek 
solutions.   
 
The prospect of mayoral dictatorship was present in the minds of 
policy makers and local government observers, as well as mayors 
themselves, but in my view there was no strong call by mayors for 
unbridled power.  Rather the mayoral mood was one of wanting to 
‘get on with the job’ (as each mayor saw it) to achieve effective 
local governance, and that meant getting on with a majority of 
councillors in order to progress the business of the council.  These 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
attempts to establish positive council behaviours as a counter to 
negative opposition, relate to the search for effectiveness - linking 
good governance with community good.   
 
As James says, the separate election of mayors can deliver 
‘conflicting mandates’ to mayors and their councils (New Zealand 
Herald, 23-24 June 2001, p C5). New Zealand’s 74 mayors are 
overwhelming outnumbered by 1098 elected councillors: 
Auckland City has 19, Hamilton City 13, Otorohanga District 7. 
And councillors include defeated mayoral candidates as well as 
publicly declared ‘wannabe [want-to-be] mayors’ – a situation that 
does not always engender collegial goodwill or trust.   Bush, 
describing the “potentially volatile recipe”, puts it this way: “In the 
end politicians will always utilize weapons appropriate to their 
commitment on any given issue” (Bush, 1997, p 29).  
 
The Office of Mayor 
In law the New Zealand mayor is defined briefly and simply as the 
presiding member of the council. There is no formal job 
description.  In the absence of policy specificity, responsibilities 
and accountabilities are open to self-definition – assumed and self-
legitimised authority related to community expectations and 
historic perceptions of the position.  My experience – and my 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
observations of colleague mayors during the 1990s – was that the 
office brought with it three distinct but intertwined functions:   
 Community leadership (representation),  
 Council leadership (as the presiding member)  
 Policy leadership (relating to council decision-making).   
That is the traditional perspective of mayoral leadership and 
mayoral authority, the convention built up over many years.  In 
other words, the job as civic leader is to ‘run the council’, which 
also means to ‘run the city’, with the purpose involving 
community well-being and the common or public good, and the 
process effective local governance.  The office of mayor is unique 
in that the employers are initially the voters and then the 
community at large. The mayor is generally a “free agent”, with 
ultimate accountability to the electorate at the ballot box (Salter 
and Doogan, 1997, p 4).  
 
In reality, it is not that simple. I will go on to show that in policy, 
the mayoral position is incorporated within the elected members’ 
group (councillors) in the primus inter pares model of first among 
equals. The consequence is a metaphorical tug-of-war when 
mayors attempt to take the traditional conventional leadership path 
towards effective local governance and councillors pull the 
leadership group elsewhere. Salter and Doogan point out that there 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
is no statutory mechanism whereby councils “can censure or 
impose limitations upon the activities of the mayor” (ibid), but 
both Rangitikei and Rodney show that disregard for traditions 
associated with the office is potentially debilitating.   
 
The functioning of the office of the mayor is dependent on a set of 
interlaced and interactive factors: who the mayor is (the person); 
what is expected of the office by the incumbent, their councils, and 
the community (the position and the situation); and how the 
council behaves in upholding or disregarding conventions relating 
to human behaviours and respect (person, position and situation).  
The ideal model proposes leadership characteristics and styles 
(person), leadership authority bridging community and council 
expectations (position), and common accord in terms of purpose 
and process (situation).  Reality produces a volatile mix, as Bush 
says.     
 
1998-2001 
My focus on the mayors of the Class of 1998-2001 is particularly 
relevant in light of the sacking of the dysfunctional Rodney 
District Council by the Minister of Local Government on April 10, 
2000, during a ‘season of discontent’ in and about local 
government (Metro Magazine-Wilson, December 1999, pp 73-79). 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Four months later, it was the August 2000 Local Government New 
Zealand (LGNZ) national council executive resignations – 
resulting from conflict between the presidential team and the chief 
executive, and involving the Prime Minister2 (New Zealand 
Herald-James, 13 June 2001, pA13). Data collection for my 
research concluded in October 2001, coinciding with the local 
government elections.  These were marked by the lowest voter 
turnout of the last five elections in the five main cities, and the 
appearance of 31 new mayors out of a total of 74, a sign of 
widespread community discontent but beyond the scope of this 
thesis for detailed analysis.  Compared with an overall 83 per cent 
voter turnout at the 1999 Parliamentary elections, the 2002 local 
government elections attracted only 46 percent of voters, 
continuing the downward trend of the previous two elections – 51 
percent in 1998, and 61 per cent in 1995 (Review Consultation 
Document, 2001, p 66).   
 
Unfinished Business 
In the same year as my mayoral retirement, McKinley – in an 
LGNZ sponsored review - referred to the legislative silence on the 
role of the mayor as “unfinished business” of  “increasing concern 
both at government level, within local government management, 
and amongst major ratepayer groups”, and there was an 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
“expectation” the forecast reform proposals would include a role 
definition (McKinley, 1998, p 18).   
 
A 1995 Massy University report on governance and management 
had also called for legislative clarity and role specification, 
recommending that: 
 “Principles underlying the role of mayors and councillors 
be described in the Local Government Act”,   
 “Model job descriptions and specifications for mayors and 
councillors” be issued by the Department of Internal Affairs, and 
that  
 LGNZ “fund a training programme for mayors and 
councillors dealing with roles and governance policy” (Howell, 
McDermott and Forgie, 1995, pp vii-viii):   
   
These writers (who noted the paucity of writings on the mayoral 
position – p 24) concluded that councils also needed “to explore 
and clarify” the role of the mayor: what it is not, what the strengths 
of the incumbent are, and what the particular council requirement 
is for (p vii).  
 
Prior to my retirement, in 1997 I organized and hosted a Mayors’ 
Forum in Hamilton. This forum - in part influenced by the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Rangitikei District Council situation (as I shall go on to discuss) 
but divorced from both McKinlay’s opinion and the Massey 
research - identified the need for a statutory job description for 
mayors (Mayors’ Forum Notes, 1997, pp 1-2).  The ‘unfinished 
business’ theme arose again in 2000 in response to the Rodney 
case.  In establishing the framework for this research, I considered 
it necessary to develop further understanding of the rationale for 
this ‘unfinished business’ and why it was a developing agenda for 
the future.  I will further discuss this in subsequent chapters.   
 
The mayoral position is found in most countries3.  Given the extent 
of international interest in the topic of leadership, there is 
surprisingly not an extensive resource of writing, academic or 
otherwise, on the mayor - what mayors do, how their roles fit 
within the operation of their councils, and whether they are 
consistent with community expectations.  Instead the focus – 
where there is one – seems to be upon the corporate body, the 
council, council members as a group and not the individual who is 
the leader of the leadership team. There are a mere handful of 
autobiographies and biographies relating to New Zealand mayors4, 
and they are of limited use to my thesis.  
 
I sought the mayoral position, aware of its comparatively poor 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
salary5 and the challenges and stress the role would bring, because 
I believed a good mayor can make a real difference.  I continue to 
hold that view.  However, performance on any job is a 
consequence of an amalgam of person, position and situation - the 
application and integration of skills and traits to functions, roles 
and responsibilities at a particular time and within a particular 
environment.     
 
This then was my background, and the influences, that led to this 
research.  
 
The Study 
This is principally a policy research project designed to develop 
“knowledge for action”, but it also aims to provide “knowledge for 
understanding” (Hakim, 1987, p3).  The action orientation relates 
to my proposition that statutory definition of the role of the mayor 
would be an enabling tool.  I argue in this thesis that the failure to 
acknowledge, in statute, the breadth of responsibility associated 
with the office of mayor, inhibits mayors in their ability to lead. 
This is compounded by policy silence relating to mayoral 
leadership functions established by tradition and convention, and 
the submersion of the office of mayor within the general elected 
members’ pool.  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In designing my research questionnaire to gather the views of the 
mayors, I also identified the importance of relationships and the 
impact of conflict as significant factors to survey, and particularly 
in relation to mayor/councillor, and mayor/chief executive 
relationships.  
 
The Current Situation and Law Reform 
My research coincided with a major review of local government 
law, with the Local Government Bill introduced to Parliament in 
December 2001, and enacted a year later. LGNZ called for 
legislative clarification of elected members’ roles including the 
mayor and regional council chairpeople, a position tracing back to 
the situation in Rangitikei (1996-97) and “the failure of the current 
legislation to provide adequate guidance to both the political and 
management wings of local authorities about how the day to day 
business of their operation should be undertaken” (Stigley, 1997, p 
2). 
   
However, government’s position remained in favour of silence, 
“because it is generally not possible to legislate for ‘good 
governance practice’ ” (Review Consultation Document, 2001, p 
25).  There is no new provision in the 2002 Act relating to the role 
of mayors. This ‘unfinished business’ (McKinlay’s 1998 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
description) underpins my research.  
 
Role and Purpose 
My view is that, in the absence of specificity, the assumption can 
be made that the role of the mayor would reflect the role and 
purposes of local government, with the mayor having a duty to 
lead the council in accordance with these purposes, as the 
presiding member. This is the status quo, and acknowledges both 
the conventional role in accord with community expectations as 
well as the practice of self-definition or self-legitimisation of 
mayoral authority and functions, as borne out by the mayors I 
surveyed.  For the future, the community and policy leadership 
functions can be linked clearly to the new sustainable development 
purpose introduced in the 2001 Bill – “to enable local decision-
making, by, and on behalf of, individuals in their communities, to 
democratically promote and action their social, economic, 
environmental, and cultural well-being in the present and for the 
future” (s8, p 15).  
 
Local governments (and mayors) are the key players in community 
well-being, and have a major role in mitigating and developing 
solutions to economic, environmental and social problems, and 
integrating various cultures and value systems to arrive at peaceful 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
coexistence (ICLEI, August 2002, p 1). The Local Government 
Message to the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development emphasised the effectiveness of local leadership, and 
that “empowered communities and great leadership have the power 
to overcome seemingly impossible barriers” (ICLEI, 2001, p 1-3).  
As the sustainability agenda unfolds, with the trends of 
urbanisation and localisation – half the world’s population now 
lives in urban areas - the role of the mayor is important and noted 
widely, and likely to be even more so in the future6.   
 
In New Zealand, 85 per cent of the population lives in urban areas 
(PCE, 2002, p 42) but there has been no widespread public debate 
focused on the position of mayor - although local media regularly 
report on the individuals who occupy the position, and the 
precedent of Rodney now exists.   
 
The mayors in my study confirmed that significant factors 
impinging on the exercising of their mayoral functions included 
human relationships, ‘uncivilised’ behaviours and disharmony as I 
will further discuss later in this report. Rodney District (1998-
2000) illustrates the situation of a mayor (Doug Armstrong) who 
was inhibited from exercising even his statutory role as 
chairperson of the council. In response to Rangitikei, Stigley 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
comments that good governance is underpinned less by detailed 
job descriptions than it is “by goodwill and the commitment of all 
parties to work together for the collective interest of their 
communities” (Stigley, 1997, p 2).   
   
I argue – in the face of government’s crafting difficulties – that 
while uncivil human behaviours and discord cannot be legislated 
away, the establishment of statutory parameters for the office of 
mayor would provide policy clarification of its central role (and 
functions).  Responsibilities and accountabilities –no more difficult 
to draft than the 1989 chief executive precedent – could be linked 
to the desired outcome of good governance practice.  This would 
provide an open and transparent framework for the three linked 
parties – the office holder (the mayor), councillors (the council), 
and the public (the community).  This framework would recognise 
the mayor as the leading political executive, with a role 
complementary to the chief executive’s as the leading 
administrative official in the governance relationship. 
 
I have introduced scholarly discourse on the issue of leadership – 
and that is in itself a complex topic – as an element in the research 
framework, to provide further opportunity for objective evaluation 
and review.   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Methodology 
The Voices of the Mayors 
As I have outlined earlier, the mayoral Class of 1998-2001 was 
chosen as my research catchment both because of its currency as 
well as the historic features that marked this term of office. This 
timeframe also marked the first decade since the 1989 reforms and 
their major transformation of New Zealand local government.   
 
The Questionnaire      
The principal methodological tool for this research was a 15-page 
questionnaire submitted (by email) to all 74 incumbent mayors 
(Attached – Appendix 1).  I chose this method, and designed the 
questionnaire, as the most efficient and effective means of 
gathering information on the empirical experience of practitioners.  
Gabriel Dekel of Digipoll - a public opinion polling and market 
research company - assisted me with the design of the 
questionnaire.  I also sought advice from a small group of mayors 
(past and present).   
 
The questionnaire contained five sections with 47 questions and 
discussion issues, and required around 45 minutes to complete.  
The sections related to: 
1. Role and Functions (incorporating community, council and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
policy leadership),  
2. Community expectations, 
3. Democracy (and the directly elected mayor),  
4. Leadership characteristics,  
5. The law.  
 
I developed these key classifications based on my own experiences 
and knowledge, to enable me to evaluate the importance the 
mayors gave to their different leadership functions (positional 
factors), to assess the characteristics and styles they identified 
(personal), as well as the situations they experienced and their 
perceptions of community expectations.  I also sought their views 
on statutory clarification of their role. The option of 
anonymity/confidentiality was offered on each point.  A summary 
of the responses, following my collation and analysis, was 
circulated by email to all respondents to ensure accuracy as to 
content and compliance with anonymity requests.  
 
The questionnaire was piloted with a small group of mayors.  I 
designed the final written questionnaire to include both specific, 
closed questions and more open-ended ones.  The design allowed 
respondents to rank on the printed questionnaire their specific 
responses on a scale of 0-10 (0 = ‘not at all’, and 10=’absolutely 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
yes, all the time’), and add explanations and examples.  
 
LGNZ publicised the project through their newsletters, and used 
the LGNZ email network to send copies of the questionnaire to all 
mayors on my behalf7.  Follow-up emails and telephone contact 
was made to encourage response, by LGNZ staff and me, and to 
mayors as well as their personal assistants, recognising that not all 
mayors were email literate.  All responses were made directly to 
me (not to LGNZ), by post or telephone, rather than the option of 
email return. Two respondents sent additional response material to 
me via email.     
 
A 60 per cent response rate (45 mayors – two from Rodney) was 
achieved. The total included six city mayors (40 per cent) and 38 
from districts (64 per cent), representing total local government 
coverage of the central North Island and widespread coverage of 
New Zealand (Map – Appendix 2). Former mayor Doug 
Armstrong (Rodney District) was invited to participate because of 
the importance of the Rodney case, and because he had been a 
member of the catchment class prior to his retirement.  
 
I analysed the response data question-by-question and section-by-
section (using graphs to illustrate some results) to determine 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
similarities and trends as well as unique elements, and then 
considered my findings with relevant literature on leadership and 
the contemporary context of local government.    
   
Ethical and Legal Issues 
All questionnaire participants were asked to sign an Informed 
Consent Form and were given my personal and professional 
assurance that I would comply with the Privacy Act 1993 and the 
Official Information Act 1982, concur with the ethical standards 
set down by The University of Waikato, and by their requirements 
for confidentiality and anonymity, and would take all reasonable 
precautions to prevent unauthorised use, access, modification or 
disclosure of personal information collected for this project.  
Participants had the option of confidentiality and anonymity versus 
explicitly authorised personal identification on all or any aspect of 
the questionnaire.  
 
Limitations 
Some mayors prepared extensive written responses to the 
questionnaire; others were brief. Telephone interviews were an 
option chosen by 11 mayors – mostly latecomers because they had 
not found time to write their response or had not initially accessed 
the questionnaire when it was first emailed.  In each of these cases, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
they responded orally to their hard copy and I recorded their 
responses.  These were generally engaging conversations and the 
human relationship dynamic was influential, but not in a manner 
that weakens the research findings.  This is borne out in the strong 
similarity in many cases with the responses from a distance i.e. 
some were lengthy, some brief.  However, the separate catchments 
were noted.    
 
The questionnaire was lengthy and time-consuming for people 
who in a majority of cases reported working 50 to 70 hour weeks.  
Some mayors, particularly from the main cities, were not able to 
find the time, although several indicated their support for the 
project. Only three mayors said ‘No’. 
 
In retrospect, I would recommend telephone or face-to-face 
interviews, but based on pre-circulated questionnaires to allow 
time for preparation. Mayors are in the business of talk and their 
oral communication skills provide sentences (and details valuable 
for archival and research purposes) rather than the headline 
phrases common to written notes when time is precious. This 
approach would reflect Neustadt’s presidential studies, as noted in 
Mintzberg (Harvard Business Review, 1998, p 9).   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Significance 
Beyond personal and sector interest – as I have previously outlined 
- this research is both important and timely.  First it addresses a 
significant gap in the academic literature on local government in 
New Zealand.  There is no scholarly analysis focussed on the role 
of mayors as local leaders. This research will add to the sparse 
body of knowledge on New Zealand mayors and will provide a 
basis for further research.   Secondly, this thesis is of considerable 
applied policy significance.  It will provide impetus to address 
what has been identified as a gap in the law.  The research report 
will be made available publicly, and specifically to the Minister of 
Local Government, LGNZ, and the local government sector 
generally.  
 
Structure 
In the next chapter I turn to history to further establish the 
framework of mayoral leadership, and for background to the 
situation encountered by today’s mayors. I trace the development 
of local government in New Zealand, touching on the 1989 
reforms and the ‘unfinished business’ of present times relating to 
the role of mayors.  I refer to the Rangitikei and Rodney cases, and 
the lead-up to the Local Government Bill (2001). I then introduce 
the current legislative proposals.   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In Chapter 3, I present the principle research material on the 
Mayors of 1998-2001, and my findings. 
 
In Chapter 4, I introduce the broader context of leadership theory, 
and review aspects related to the link between personal 
characteristics, leader positions and authority, and the 
environments in which leaders find themselves.  I draw on a 
selection of leadership literature, with a focus on writings from the 
1990s.     
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I outline my conclusions about the role of the 
mayors and local government leadership in New Zealand, and my 
recommendations for reform. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  I was elected as a city councillor at the time the ‘parent’ Local Government 
Act (1974) was born, elected as mayor at the time of the major 1989 local 
government reform, and after serving three terms retired in 1998 as further 
reform was predicted (and initiated by the new Labour Government elected the 
following year).  My first-hand knowledge of the position of mayor, its 
functions and practice, was augmented (and balanced?) by my nine years’ 
experience in the ‘Mayors’ Club’ – the informal term used to describe 
incumbent mayors.  I worked closely with Waikato regional mayors, and 
represented the ‘Metro Mayors’ – the mayors of New Zealand’s 10 main cities 
with populations over 100,000 – on the national council of Local Government 
New Zealand (LGNZ), 1990-1998.  Through my involvement with the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), 1994-2002, 
and through Hamilton’s international sister city relationships (in the United 
States, Japan and China), I also gained collegial awareness of the roles played 
by a number of mayors in other countries. Hamilton City Council was the first 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
New Zealand local government (with Waitakere City) to join ICLEI (1994).  I 
was elected as the Asia Pacific representative on ICLEI’s Global Executive 
Committee 1998 -2000, and in 2001 was appointed to ICLEI’s Global Advisory 
Council. ICLEI is the international agency for local governments, developing 
and promoting international campaigns for sustainable development action at 
the local level (www.iclei.org). 
 
2.  The LGNZ president, vice president and some executive members resigned 
in response to local government concerns at the public spat, which followed the 
non-renewal of the chief executive’s contract. Influences were the involvement 
of the Prime Minister and Minister of Local Government amidst public 
allegations that the Minister refused to meet with the chief executive, and that 
the Prime Minister had been embarrassed by an LGNZ administrative slip-up 
involving her attendance at the annual national conference earlier in the year. 
 
3.  Membership of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), as well 
as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) 
illustrates the global nature of local government, and the widespread application 
– east, west, north and south – of locally elected or appointed mayors  
(www.iula.org and www.iclie.org). 
 
 4. Biographies have been published on Georgina Beyer - Carterton (Casey, 
1999), A.M. Linton - Rotorua (Jansen, 1995),  Sir Lloyd Elsmore - Manukau 
(Garus, 1990), Charles Allison - Wellington (Eiby, 1987),  and Elizabeth Yates 
(Devaliant, c1996 and Williams, 1993).  Autobiographies have been published 
by Sir Harry Barker-Gisborne (1992), Sir Hamish Hay –Christchurch (1989), 
Ernest Andrews – Christchurch (1958) and Cliff Bishop – Petone (1985). 
 
5. In 1989 when I was elected, the mayor’s remuneration was 
$70,000p.a.compared with the CEO’s at $130,000p.a.  In 2002, Hamilton’s 
mayor received $90,000p.a. and the CEO $240,000. 
 
 6. Italy (which returned to citizen-elected mayors in 1993) has been debating 
‘omnivorous’ mayors (power and function-hungry) and there is international 
discussion on ‘role control’ and scrutiny processes to keep mayors accountable 
(Urban Age, 1996). China has just held its first people’s forum, publicly 
analysing initially the performance of a deputy mayor, requiring this official to 
address deficiencies, and report back (China Daily, 2001).  India has introduced 
mandatory gender allocations to ensure a percentage of mayors (and local 
government elected officials) are women (Urban Age, 1996).  
 
7. I was awarded (jointly) the 2001 LGNZ Dame Catherine Tizard scholarship 
for this research project. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
CHAPTER 2 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT HISTORY AND THE LAW 
 
Local Government History 
In this chapter I turn to the past, to the origins of local government 
and the mayoralty in New Zealand. Although my focus is the 
situation encountered by today’s mayors, history holds some 
relevant lessons relating to the presence of conflict and discord, 
and the impact of human behaviours on mayoral tradition and 
convention. Ringer (1991) describes it as a history of  “fierce 
parochialism and suspicion of central government”, confirming the 
earliest origins of local-ness and tensions (Ringer, 1991, pp 236-
259).   
 
Gibbons’ history of Hamilton (1977) shows that council conflict 
involving mayors was evident in the first councils 125 years ago.1  
Another example, in Auckland in 1902, records councillors trading 
insults – one hinting impropriety, the other responding with 
‘coward and liar’ (NZ Herald, 4 April 2002, p A8).     
 
My own experience during the last three decades of the 20th 
century covers the terms of four previous mayors (Denis Rogers, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Mike Minogue, Bruce Beetham and Ross Jansen), and all were 
pitted with occasions of conflict and deep divisions, just as my 
own mayoralty was. My perception is that council culture – 
particularly since the early 1980s - has become more violent, its 
elected member participants more virulent and less civil in their 
political and personal styles, but analysis of this is beyond the 
scope of my research. What is pertinent, however, is the fact that 
the historical landmark for council conflict in New Zealand  - the 
self-destruction of the Rodney District Council – has occurred in 
the 21st century, in today’s political and social climate, and within 
the timeframe of my research focus. 
   
My intention, in briefly tracing the history of local government, is 
to position my discussion in the period following the significant 
1989 legislative reform, to recognise the ongoing robustness of the 
political environment, and to set out the factors that currently 
inhibit local leadership.  I have referred to McKinlay (1990), Reid 
(2000), and Belich (2001) to develop the following synopsis of the 
development of local government in New Zealand, and to 
acknowledge the inclusion of the role of the mayor from the outset.  
I will further explore the international origins of the Office of 
Mayor in a subsequent chapter.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In the New Zealand context, the mayoral position was part of the 
citizen-established urban council structure from the beginning of 
colonial settlement.  The wave of new settlers to the new colony 
during the 19th century (500,000 people from 1840-822) led to the 
establishment of villages and towns. Locals got on with their local 
governance, setting up their own territory-based boards and 
councils – led by elected mayors - to take responsibility for local 
affairs. Elected central government arrived in 1856. Confirmation 
of the convention of directly elected mayors came in the 1876 
Municipal Corporations Act (MCA). Annual elections applied to 
municipal councils until 1900, and to the mayoral position until 
1913, followed by biennial elections until 1935 when the triennial 
term was introduced.  Conversely, counties had triennial elections 
from 1920 onwards, and elected members chose their own 
chairperson from among themselves until 1989 when their councils 
were incorporated into combined urban-rural districts.      
 
Wars (colonial forces versus indigenous Maori) in the 1860s 
resulted in the government’s acquisition of land for the 
development of settlements necessary for a growing colonial 
economy3.  By 1867 there were 21 local self-government units of 
(citizen-established and elected) town or borough councils termed 
‘municipalities’ and led by mayors.  The MCA of that year 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
established model bylaws and gave them the right to run gasworks, 
libraries, reserves, gymnasia and charitable institutions.  Nine 
years later, a new act - the MCA(1876) - abolished the provincial 
councils, local governments took over some of their functions, and 
direct election for mayors of cities and boroughs was introduced, 
constitutionally confirming local practice. It had taken 27 years to 
systematise the creation of local bodies set up by the new settlers 
to ‘govern’ their settlements - with mayoral leadership. The 
existing municipalities – which had then increased by self-
determination to 36 - were brought under the new MCA, and rural 
New Zealand was divided into 63 counties under the Counties Act.  
By 1881 there were 128 cities, towns and counties4.  Territorially-
based local bodies and special purpose authorities multiplied in the 
years that followed, despite Liberal-led attempts in 1895, 1896, 
1897, and 1912, and then Labour in 1936, at reform, rationalisation 
of function, and enforced amalgamation.   
 
In 1946 the Labour Government established the first Local 
Government Commission – to prepare schemes for local body 
mergers and changes - but its coercive powers were substantially 
reduced by the 1949 National Government.  The Second Labour 
Government (1957-60) again focused on reform, with the first-ever 
major inquiry into the structure of local government, but the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
change of government saw its recommendations largely ignored.  
In 1963, the National Government collapsed six special purpose 
boards and created the Auckland Regional Authority, and a new 
Local Government Commission was set up to work at regional 
schemes.  The third Labour Government (1972-75) established the 
Local Government Act 1974 (LGA 1974), and strengthened the 
commission’s powers to impose reforms, but these were again 
reduced by the new National Government in 1976.    
 
Labour again took office in 1984, and began its overall national 
public sector reform programme. This led to the major 1989 
changes to the local government sector, based on a push for 
rationalisation and with a focus on efficiency, effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability. Ringer describes the outcome as 
changing the face of local government “irrevocably and 
permanently” (Ringer, 1991, p 244). By then, there were a total of 
217 territorial local bodies  (27 cities and 89 borough councils in 
urban areas, 80 county councils, 20 district councils with an urban-
rural mix, and one town council) in addition to the regional, united, 
and community councils, and some 600 special purpose boards.   
 
The 1989 Local Government Amendment Act No 2 (LGAA2) 
created a new streamlined structure of 86 multi-purpose local 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
authorities - 14 regional, 14 city and 59 district councils, with 
Gisborne combining district and regional powers.  Ad hoc and 
special purpose authorities were abolished.  The declared reform 
aim was to make local government “more effective, more 
democratic and accountable, and cheaper to run” (Ringer, p 241).  
The ‘purposes’ were set out in Section 37K and recognised local-
ness as well as community ‘identities and values’, along with 
community accountability and participatory requirements (local 
democracy). Two major new requirements were the statutory duty 
to prepare an Annual Plan through a public participation process, 
and to separate policy formation (elected members) and 
management (chief executive).  Councils were enabled to employ 
only the chief executive (CEO), who in turn employed other staff. 
Regional councils were given county-style council-elected 
chairpeople, and the Office of Mayor was retained for the 74 city 
and district councils (including Gisborne, which was established as 
a unitary council combining district and regional functions).    
 
In the new organisational structure, the paramount concern was the 
relationship between the council and management (McKinlay, 
1998, p 12). A specific legal framework was applied to chief 
executives even including provisions relating to their recruitment 
and employment contracts, but there was continuing silence on the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
mayor and councillors – the elected members who make up the 
council -apart from confirmation of the mayor’s role to preside 
over the council.  It is this failure in 1989 to provide a 
complementary constitutional provision for mayors in the new 
organisational relationship that my thesis addresses, and the 
consequence of continuing reliance on convention and tradition as 
the foundation of the mayoral office leadership role.   
 
Reid describes New Zealand local government history as one 
“dominated by competing policy principles and ideologies” and 
says the “tension resulting from attempts to balance notions of 
autonomy and accountability” has been of importance – “an 
historic drive for greater freedom and local self-determination 
balanced against the view that greater local choice must be 
accompanied by ‘tighter’ forms of accountability and scrutiny” 
(Reid, 2001, p 2).  For the purpose of my research, this can be 
translated and individualised as a description of mayoral history - 
with mayors operating in this competitive and tense environment 
and driving to legitimise their authority locally.   
 
The 1990s 
The post reform period of 1989-2001 was marked by ongoing 
tensions – between local and central government (roles, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
responsibilities and the concept of partnership), between councils 
and their communities (including cynicism over public 
participation processes), and within councils (the 
politician/management interface as well as mayor/councillor 
relationships).         
 
As I have outlined in the opening chapter, the unfolding of the 
1990s saw the role of mayors, and chief executives, attracting 
attention, along with relationship difficulties at councils around the 
country.  In the absence of a statutory job description, mayors 
began to craft their own role in the new governance model, 
balancing the traditional (and increasing) expectations of 
community leader, with their assumed political executive and 
policy leadership functions within their councils.  This absence of 
guidelines on their role and functions led to new tensions in local 
government. 
 
Two scholarly observations at the time confirm these tensions, as 
well as the problematic nature of governance roles and 
relationships and the need for role clarification.   British local 
government professor Michael Clarke, in reporting on his 1997 
visit to New Zealand, refers to “tense and difficult” council 
relationships, the “very good” abilities of most mayors at handling 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
“internal politics”, and – in relation to the political/administrative 
interface – the fine dividing line between “influence and executive 
action” (Clarke, 1997, pp 4-7).  Earlier, in their 1995 Massey 
University report – which focuses on local government governance 
and management generally and not specifically the role of the 
mayor – Howell, McDermott and Forgie identify “a gap” (p 29) in 
terms of defined roles and responsibilities, and suggest 
“governance failures” were the root many of “the difficulties” 
(Howell, McDermott, and Forgie, 1995, p v).   
 
Acknowledging the political/administrative relationship as “both 
increasingly critical and increasingly difficult in an unstable and 
unpredictable environment” (p 9), these authors suggest the 
prescribed role of the CEO confuses “political and executive 
responsibility and accountability, on the one hand, and undermines 
the basis of representation on the other” (p 29).   
 
This is an important point, and confirms the benefits of 
complementary statutory role prescriptions, to replace confusion 
with clarity in the political/administrative governance interface, 
and to balance the authority and power of CEOs. By the end of 
1995 (and two terms of office following the 1989 reform), 36 out 
of the 86 councils had replaced their CEOs, at least 21 of these had 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
left because of relationship difficulties and role confusion, and the 
trend was continuing (pp 1-2).    
 
Late in 1996, mayor/councillor conflict in Rangitikei District 
Council drew in LGNZ’s national council. As I have already 
acknowledged, I was a member of the national council at this time.  
A legal opinion was sought by LGNZ (from Simpson Grierson, 
Wellington), concerning the legal status of the mayor, the 
mayor/council relationship and the council/management interface. 
This was in response to the council’s resolutions confining in 
particular the mayor to a community leadership figurehead role, 
and reducing his involvement in council governance matters.  
LGNZ CEO Carol Stigley’s view was that there were lessons to be 
learned from Rangitikei, and that the situation there applied to 
“many other councils” (Stigley, 1997, p 2).  The issues were to be 
part of LGNZ’s work programme for 1997-98, and “feed directly 
into proposals for a review of the Local Government Act” (ibid).   
 
Mayors collectively – at this time – were clearly concerned about 
Rangitikei, about the status of the mayoral role generally, and 
about their own situations.  A rare insight into their views is 
provided in notes recording discussion at the June 1997 Mayors’ 
Forum in Hamilton. The meeting record does not disclose the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
number of mayors who attended, but my recollection is about 30, 
including Rangitikei Mayor John Wilson5.  This was the first time 
such an event had been held. 
 
The Rangitikei issue was discussed at the Forum, “managing 
conflict” was identified as a “major role” for mayors, and there 
was support for mayoral role clarification in law (Mayors’ Forum 
Notes, June 13, 1997, pp 1-2).   The Notes record discussion that 
mayors had  “no power except the power of persuasion”, and 
recommended statutory provision for mayors similar to the 1989 
CEO provision, adding there was a need for discussion on “how 
much power”.  There was concern that the mayoral role should not 
be “too descriptive in law”, and the “challenge” was recorded “for 
mayors to develop their role to reflect their council.”   A summary 
of roles was set out: 
Ceremonial, leader, the voice of the council and the 
community, advocate, history and tradition, chair of council, 
public relations, problem solver, facilitator, information 
source, social worker, appeal authority, last resort, good 
driver  (distances to travel), arbitrator, ombudsman, reflector 
of the spirit of the city, leader of visions and values, 
empower, promoter, civic leadership, strategic leadership etc. 
 
This summary illustrates the complexity of leadership expectations 
incorporated within the three integrated mayoral roles – 
community, council and policy leadership – as well as the mayors’ 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
response to those expectations, and the difficulty inherent in 
attempting a detailed prescription of the job. However, to the 
mayors, this is how ‘it is’, and their Hamilton definition bears 
strong similarities to the views of a number of observers, both in 
New Zealand and internationally, as I shall go on to discuss in 
subsequent chapters.  I again acknowledge that I was a participant 
in the Hamilton Forum, and my own practitioner experience 
matched that of my colleague mayors. 
 
The Forum provides a unique first-hand collective account of 
mayoral experience that remains relevant today, with recognition 
of:  
 The changing role of local government and the increasing 
expectations of their role,  
 The trinity of community/council/policy leadership 
functions (and their complexity),  
 The ‘crucial’ nature of the executive relationship between 
the mayor (as political leader) and the CEO (as administrative 
leader).  
 
Statutory recognition of the mayor’s executive role in the 
appointment and performance monitoring of the CEO, was raised. 
It was noted that some councils had attempted to exclude the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
mayor from involvement in the CEO appointment and monitoring 
function, and that many CEOs had “gone” since 1989.6   
 
Mayors expressed concerns over the media, and identified the 
problematic nature of council leadership, and the impact of conflict 
and tensions in the exercising of their leadership functions. 
 
A few months later such tensions came to a head. During the 4th 
post-reform term of office (1998-2001 and the focus of this 
research), the Minister of Local Government Sandra Lee sacked 
the Rodney District Council.  Also, the executive of LGNZ 
disintegrated, and although the reasons are not relevant to my 
research, the incident illustrates the turbulent times and difficulties 
with governance relationships as well as the local/national 
governmental relationship7.  A new government (the Labour 
Alliance coalition) was elected in 1999, and in June 2001 launched 
the Local Government Review Consultation Document (RCD), 
which set out the proposed reform of the Local Government Act. 
  
The October 2001 local government elections saw a record 12 
incumbent mayors defeated - including five first-termers.  One 
assessment – based on LGNZ’s initial evaluation – is that this was 
community retaliation against council conflict.  With the exception 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
of only one (Wairoa’s Derek Fox), all the ousted mayors had 
robust public (media) profiles and troubled councils.  As well, 19 
mayors – a record - retired, many of these departing from 
environments of disharmony.  The overall result was 31 new 
mayors out of 74.  There was an overall drop of 5 per cent in voter 
turnout (to 46 percent), and this can be viewed as increasing 
democratic turn-off.   
    
Pejorative terms such as ‘herding cats’, ‘massed cockfights’, and 
‘bloody struggles’ had been used to describe the behaviour of 
some local government politicians of that period and this reference 
(Metro Magazine, December 1999) was included in the Report of 
the Ministerial Review of the Rodney District Council (1 March, 
2000).  The Rodney Report, and Cabinet papers (October 2000-
June 2001) during the lead-up to government’s launch of Local 
Government Review Consultation Document in June 2001 – which 
sets out the proposed reform of the LGA - illustrate the extent of 
concerns at the troubles within the country’s councils.  
  
Roles, Responsibilities and Unfinished Business 
Before moving on to discuss the Rodney case and the 2001 reform 
bill, it is useful to reflect on the 1989 reforms, the rationale for 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
them, and in particular, aspects relating to the political-
administrative governance relationship. 
 
In his 1998 LGNZ-commissioned monograph, McKinlay suggests 
that a decade earlier the council/management relationship had been 
of “paramount concern” to the government, and this led to the 
policy/implementation separation in the 1989 local government 
legislation, and the application in that of the 1988 State Sector Act 
model in prescribing CEO responsibilities and accountabilities 
(McKinlay, 1998, pp 12-13). The objective then was “to remove 
mayors and councillors” from day to day intervention, and have 
them focus instead on policy issues and monitoring the CEO’s 
implementation of council decisions.  To me, the CEO provisions 
also enabled the mayor and councillors to remove council staff 
from controlling policy issues and the strategic direction of the 
council.  The control of councils by CEOs, through their control of 
council staff, was and still is a matter of equal importance in the 
governance relationship, but the focus too often illustrates a bias 
towards administrative officials.    
 
Eight years later, McKinlay points to “the failure of the legislation 
to define, clearly, the role of elected members in a way which is 
complementary to the statutory definition of the role of the CEO 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
(in s.119D)” as “a matter of increasing concern” at government 
level, within local government management, and among major 
ratepayer groups (p 18).  
 
The particular relevance of McKinlay’s ‘unfinished business’ 
analysis to my research relates to the 1988 state sector origins of 
the 1989 local government CEO job description.  McKinlay 
himself points out that the 1998 state model rests on the 
minister/chief executive relationship, with policy emanating from 
the responsible minister, and the chief executive responsible for 
departmental activities, policy implementation, and the 
employment of staff.  In the transfer of this model to local 
government in 1989, the minister’s role is taken up by the multi-
member council rather than by the mayoral individual - an 
aberration of the office-to-office and person-to-person governance 
relationship established in the original state sector model.  
Although tradition and convention support a complementary 
CEO/mayor relationship as envisaged, with the CEO as 
administrative leader and the mayor as council and policy leader, 
in reality this is dependent on the person/position/situation mix in 
each case, leaving both the CEO and the council able to ‘lame 
duck’ the mayor (as was discussed at the 1998 Mayors Forum).   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
My thesis is that the mayoral role requires clarification 
independently of other elected members (the councillors) to 
strengthen the responsibility/accountability requirement of the two 
complementary executive positions (CEO and mayor).    
   
In an interview for this research project, Sir Brian Elwood - a 
former mayor of Palmerston North who had a pivotal role in 
designing the 1989 legislation as chairperson of the Local 
Government Commission at that time – says the principal reason 
for the 1989 reforms’ silence on the mayoral role (rather than a 
parallel provision to the new CEO section) was the traditional 
respect for the office of the mayor, allowing the mayor to govern 
in the appropriate fashion (Elwood, 2001, p 1). 
The mayor’s office seemed to have adequate safeguards and 
adequate checks and balances by reason of the conventions 
which have been built up over many years, indeed perhaps 
over centuries, and certainly in New Zealand for over 100 
years. 
 
It was a time honoured one, protected by conventions which 
in the main were honoured by the councils around New 
Zealand.  It required no prescriptive legislation in order to 
ensure the mayor was seen as the community leader.  There 
was the public expectation …   
 
Councillors generally accepted that the mayor provided 
leadership and cohesion, and overall the mayoral office 
worked extraordinarily well.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Thus Elwood defines conventions in terms of honour and respect 
for the office, combined with acknowledgement that the role 
involved both community and council leadership. He now suggests 
that inability to cope with the 1989 changes was more a 
consequence of “difficulties in interpersonal relationships than any 
lack of prescription [for mayors and councillors] in the legislation” 
(ibid). This view pinpoints the importance of behaviours in the 
governance situation, but does not address the consequence of 
councillor behaviours that are not in accord with his time-
honoured convention of mayoral protection.   
 
In the light of the Rodney experience, Elwood concludes that 
while a mayoral role definition is not “necessary” and “negative 
aspects would outweigh any such definition”, “it could be helpful”.  
To him, the “fundamental determinant of a successful political 
being” is “the nature of the person”.  The difficulty in defining the 
mayoral role in law “is to define behaviour” (p 2): 
After all, it is the behaviour of the mayor in leading, 
persuading and guiding others to the mayor’s point of view.  
In New Zealand society there are so many checks and 
balances against the abuse of power in any particular office 
that it would be seen to be going against the trends to invest a 
particular politically elected person with any exclusive 
powers.  Not even the Prime Minister has a legally defined 
basis for the exercise of his or her powers as distinct from 
say the constitutional arrangements applicable to the 
President of the United States of America.  The constitutional 
conventions have acted very effectively not to destroy 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
leadership but to prevent the emergence of any perception of 
dictatorial powers. 
 
Although this fundamental determinant of success – personal 
characteristics and behaviours – is a view shared by contemporary 
leadership theorists (and I shall discuss this further in the fourth 
chapter), it is a formula applied to leadership generally, not just 
political leadership. Elwood’s precautionary approach – in giving 
greater weight to the prevention of abuse of power, ahead of role 
prescription – seems inconsistent in the context of the 1989 
provisions for CEOs, by differentiating between the politically 
elected person (the mayor) and the appointed public official (the 
CEO), when complementary or equal treatment seems more 
logical in a governance relationship of such “paramount 
importance”.   
 
My thesis is that convention and tradition have been eroded to the 
detriment of the mayoral leadership function, and while the 
person-position-situation mix will continue to produce a variety of 
results, clarification of the mayor’s role, to include responsibilities 
and accountabilities, would in turn clarify leadership relationships 
both with the CEO and councillors and enhance the potential for 
effective local governance. This is an argument in favour of 
authority clarification, not a call for an extension of mayoral 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
powers, and in fact Elwood’s concerns over potential abuse of 
powers would be further met by bringing councillors and CEOs 
into the same arena through prescriptive transparency.   
 
Rangitikei, Rodney, and the 1998 Mayors’ Forum are evidence 
that in reality, mayors can be rendered power-less, their legitimate 
authority based on convention, tradition and community 
expectations removed by majority council vote, and destroyed by 
individual behaviours targeting both the mayoral office and the 
mayoral person.  Even the most able leader (the person) is at risk 
when bad-will replaces the necessary ingredient of goodwill in this 
inevitably political environment (the office and the situation). 
Elwood’s check and balances have become tools for the abuse of 
the mayor’s core leadership role, rather than accountability 
mechanisms aimed at curbing mayors from abusing their 
legitimate authority. 
 
However, Elwood does qualify his view, suggesting now that 
mayoral role clarification ‘may be helpful’ as a consequence of the 
Rodney case. 
 
Legitimacy and Authority 
In this historical overview I do not dig deeply to find and analyse 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
motivations.  The purpose is simply to illustrate the growth and 
development of local government in New Zealand over time, the 
ongoing presence of tensions in human political relationships, the 
failure in the current climate to recognise the importance of the 
mayor’s leadership role - particularly in relation to the governance 
relationship - and the continuing reliance on tradition and 
convention to shape that role.   
 
Wherever leadership arises, or is expected or sought or 
acknowledged or denied, it is usually associated with functions and 
structures, socio-political tensions, authority and legitimacy. While 
“the electoral procedure serves as a means of legitimising the 
assignment of a person to [the] office of authority”, with elections 
“expressions of the general will of the majority” (Magill, 1995, p 
724), the authority of the mayor to exercise the leadership function 
is not based on the acknowledgement of the position in law.  And 
that is my issue.  
 
Contemporary scholars associate leadership authority with both 
power and influence, and the theoretical concept of legitimate 
authority is embodied in the sentiment that people feel “morally 
obligated to submit to power that is perceived to be valuable and 
conforms to the general will of society”, although ultimately the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
official “relies on the existence of good will” (Magill, pp 722-724).  
 
In today’s robust council environment, moral obligation is not a 
guaranteed companion. The mayor – both person and position – 
has civil legitimacy, but the authority associated by convention and 
tradition with the office remains only notionally legitimate, and is 
dependent on the unique and complex set of circumstances in situ 
at the time.  The community good will manifest in the election 
process may be overcome by collegial bad will within the council, 
potentially robbing the mayor of legitimate authority and as a 
result the ability to exercise the function to lead.    
 
Furthermore, the ongoing impact of the 1988 State Services model, 
with the confirmation of the CEO’s leadership role in the 2002 
reform, leaves the mayor even more at risk of being blocked from 
exercising the political leadership function where councils fail to 
abide by convention and tradition.  Rangitikei and Rodney have 
provided precedents. 
 
I now turn to the Rodney case in more detail, and especially its 
influence on the preparation of the 2001 local government reform 
bill. 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Ministerial Review of the Rodney District Council 
New Zealand’s general elections took place in 1999, one year into 
the local government triennium (1998-2001), which is the time-
frame focus of my thesis.  The change of government coincided 
with (1) the Rodney case with its requirement for immediate 
attention by the new Minister for Local Government and by 
Cabinet, and (2) the development of the new Local Government 
Bill.    
 
The lead-up to the 10 April, 2000 dismissal of the Rodney District 
Council (RDC) by the Minister of Local Government (Sandra Lee) 
in response to the 1 March, 2000 Ministerial Review Report, was 
intense and driven by a number of key factors which occurred 
during the previous 18 months or so.  Matters identified in the final 
Review Report and particularly relevant to my research include the 
mayor’s difficulty in maintaining a civilised order within meetings 
in the face of determined disruption, opposition to his role in 
determining the committee structure and the appointment of 
chairpeople, and the ‘strong’ CEO together with the mayor’s role 
in the CEO contract (and performance) negotiations.  Put another 
way, Standing Orders proved an ineffective tool (for both the 
mayor and the council), some councillors refused to abide by 
conduct codes, and there was a blurring of the political-
  
                              
 
                                                                   
management interface. The mayor was inhibited and incapacitated 
by the actions of others, and by his own personal inability to rely 
on the conventional authority accorded the office he held.      
 
The two-person Rodney Review Authority (Michael Gross and 
Alan Bickers) was appointed during the central government 
November-December 1999 transitional period as the newly elected 
Labour-Alliance Government moved into office after replacing the 
previous National Government.  The Rodney District Council 
sought the review on 20 October, 1999, acknowledging:  
The dysfunction that has developed in the Council, the 
relationship problems existing among elected members and 
between elected members and the Council’s General 
Manager [CEO], and that there are risks to the Council in 
meeting its statutory obligations  (Ministerial Review Report 
Executive Summary, 1 March 2000, p 1). 
 
 
This was the first Ministerial Review of a local authority in New 
Zealand’s history, and the first dismissal of a sitting council. Both 
the mayor (21 March 2000) and the CEO resigned prior to the 
sacking of the council.  A commissioner (Grant Kirby) was 
appointed to act as the council (in a combination executive role) 
until elections were held in March 2001.  
 
The Review Authority’s conclusions confirmed Rodney’s self-
  
                              
 
                                                                   
analysis. In summary, the Review Report linked the council’s 
dysfunctionalism to the climate of “less than ideal”, 
“inappropriate”, and “verbally abusive” human behaviours and 
relationships, and the “failure to properly enforce Standing 
Orders”, the “the failure of the Chairperson [the mayor] to control 
meetings” (Ministerial Review Report, 1 March 2000, pp 4-8). 
Some elected members have not observed the unwritten 
protocols of normal good behaviour in public towards their 
peers and the Council’s management (p 9). 
 
 
Tensions had been “exacerbated by conflicting views, strong 
personalities and disruptive tactics by some elected members, 
which have not been countered by strong leadership” (p 15). The 
report identified the potential for the CEO to become “dominant” 
(p 10), and the failure in much of the council’s work to view the 
interests of the community as “paramount”  
(p 4). 
 
The reviewers observed, “as a result of reading more than 80 
submissions comprising several hundred pages and hearing 
evidence for more than 60 hours”, with respect to governance: 
 The RDC is clearly dysfunctional  - there is an inability to 
resolve conflicts of opinion in a rational and open manner. 
 There is an inadequate understanding by some elected 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
members of relevant legislation and a lack of willingness to abide 
by it. 
 There is a frustration on the part of some elected members 
due to their inability to input into the performance management of 
the General Manager. 
 Recognition of the General Manager’s role to provide 
advice to the Council is not universally accepted; advice is 
frequently ignored or deliberately misunderstood, suggesting a 
lack of objectivity on the part of elected members; 
 The chain of events over a number of years has resulted in 
an ‘unhealthy’ culture in the RDC which is not conducive to 
innovation and good relationships between management/staff and 
elected members and members of the community 
 The Mayor has not adopted a proactive role in leadership of 
the Council and by default, the General Manager has assumed that 
role on occasions  (p 4). 
 
While the reviewers went on to recommend a relationships/process 
framework for addressing Rodney’s problems, they reported that 
they did not have confidence such a framework could be 
implemented effectively to resolve those problems (p 18), and 
therefore instead recommended the death sentence for the entire 
elected wing, and a new leader to replace the entire executive - a 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
commissioner.  
 
The Rodney Influence 
Following the Minister Lee’s April 2000 sacking of the council, in 
October that year the two reviewers published Lessons from the 
Rodney Experience as “a guide to good practice in local 
governance”, and “intended to supplement guidelines provided by 
the Controller and Auditor General…the Department of Internal 
Affairs, Ministry for the Environment, other Government agencies, 
and Local Government New Zealand’s handbook” (Bickers, 2000, 
p 2). 
 
This report is particularly relevant to my research. It refers back to 
the 1974 LGA’s “heavy detail” but with “little help” as to the role 
of elected persons, and notes the lack of a mayoral job description 
similar to the provisions for chief executives in the 1989 reforms 
(p 10). Describing the current local government climate, the 
authors identify “a range of significant issues that need to be well 
managed by local authorities in the interest of good governance” 
and suggest three categories:  governance practice, relationships 
between elected members and management, and operational 
processes (p 10). 
Where these matters are not well managed there can be 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
conflict and dysfunctional behaviour among elected members 
leading to inappropriate policies, ineffective and inefficient 
implementation by management, loss of confidence in the 
local authority by the community and decline in staff morale 
with high rates of turnover. 
 
 
The authors confirm the mayor’s roles of community leader and 
council chairperson, and as “spokespersons for their local 
authority”, and “the focal point for fellow councillors” (p 14).   
The mayor also has a responsibility to guide and to manage 
the aspirations of individual councillors and to handle 
conflicting views and the opinions of the individual 
councillors.  It is that leader’s responsibility to resolve issues 
of difference between the elected body and the professional 
leadership of the authority (ibid).    
 
 
The recommended good practice says the responsibility for making 
a formal training programme available to elected members – 
including how to most effectively understand the role of the mayor 
– “should lie” with the chief executive “in consultation with the 
mayor” (pp 14-15). This illustrates the importance of the mayor’s 
executive role, and the complementary nature of the mayor/CEO 
governance relationship.  
 
In the section on committee structure, the authors point to “a risk” 
that direct relationships between committees “particularly their 
chairs” and departments that “bypass the chief executive”, can 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
‘compromise the authority and accountability of the chief 
executive for the actions of his/her staff” (p 21).  And that 
committee structure “should be based on the needs of the council 
and not be used to accord status or recognition of individual 
elected members …” (p 22).  There is no reference to mayors, or to 
the potential to ‘bypass’ their office in a similar manner to that 
identified as a risk to the chief executive. The role of the mayor is 
acknowledged in relation to the relationship with the chief 
executive, with the author’s view that employment issues of 
concerns to councillors “can only be pursued through the mayor 
with the chief executive” (p 26).  This fails to address the situation 
in which the mayor can be ‘bypassed’ if the council resolves a 
political structure conferring authority on other councillors and 
excluding the mayor from the chief executive performance 
monitoring process.  The ‘might of numbers’ can be used to 
exclude the mayor.   
 
My argument is that this ‘democratic’ decision-making process can 
be accorded status above the representative democratic process 
that elects a person to the mayoral office, and as such is an 
example of mayors inhibited in exercising the function to lead.  
The earlier Rangitikei situation also illustrates this. 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
My overall interest in what I have termed the ‘Rodney Influence’ 
is the perpetuation of the belief in tradition, convention, and 
process as an appropriate foundation for today’s governance 
functions, along with the unspoken requirement for goodwill.  And 
it is this ideal kitset approach to good governance that has 
influenced the 2001 reform proposals. The real lesson from 
Rodney (and Rangitikei) is that there is too great a risk that this 
approach will not be successful. The human relationships factor is 
the key to the chemistry of good governance, with goodwill too 
easily able to be sacrificed to politics.  The mayor is a key player 
but, as I have said, it is a crowd scene.  
 
My reading of official documents relating to the 2001 Bill, 
including the Cabinet papers related to the review development, 
confirms that relationship issues (council/CEO and 
council/community) and the concept of a Code of Conduct, as well 
as community leadership, powers and accountabilities, were on the 
agenda.  These reflect the contemporary situation within which 
local government was operating at this time, including the 
influence of the Rodney case.  Significantly, the issue of role 
clarification is raised, but little attention was given to mayors, as I 
will now go on to discuss.  
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The Local Government Act Review  
On 7 March 2000 – a week after receiving the Rodney Review 
Report - the Labour-Alliance coalition government launched a 
series of forums with local government, and reached agreement to 
review (and ‘modernise’) the Local Government Act (1974) and 
two other major local government laws (Rating Powers and Local 
Elections and Polls). In July, Lee formally initiated the review 
process. Most central government departments were involved in 
the development work, as well as LGNZ, SOLGM, and local 
government representatives.  Cabinet was involved in setting 
directions and joint local-central government workshops were held 
on key issues.  From October 2000-June 2001 a series of Cabinet 
papers were developed from the work of the joint central and local 
government working groups, and at least five versions of the draft 
proposals.  
 
On 9 November 2000, the government released a Statement of 
Policy Direction (SP) at a joint local government forum, and 
public submissions were invited.  In June 2001, a Review 
Consultation Document (CD) was made public outlining the 
legislative proposals, with a deadline of 30 August for 
submissions. There were 655 submissions. Following 
consideration of submissions, final Cabinet decisions were made in 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
October-December, and the draft legislation was introduced to 
Parliament on 19 December 2001 for enactment in 20028. 
 
Review Consultation Document    
The 68-page CD devotes nine pages (pp 24-32) to the roles and 
responsibilities of local authorities, and the word ‘mayor’ is used 
only three times: 
 Page 24 - the governance map, alongside “councillor” and 
“chair”   
 Page 31 – a one-sentence reference to the direct election of 
mayors   
 Page 66 – the number of elected members (including 
mayors).  
  
Most importantly, in respect to the purpose of my research, and 
despite the local government sector’s expectations of specific role 
clarification, the document confirms the continuation of legislative 
silence on the role of mayors and councillors “because it is 
generally not possible to legislate for good governance practice” (p 
25).  Instead guidance “will be through mechanisms such as 
standing orders for local authority meetings”, and the development 
of national good practice guides - just as the Rodney reviewers 
recommended but considered ineffective in the Rodney situation.  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
This also represents support for the Elwood reliance on tradition 
and convention, and disregards the position of LGNZ and the 
climate of the times (as I have previously outlined).  It also 
suggests that the DIA officials had an ideal process orientation 
towards governance issues, and this had not changed since the eve 
of the Rodney review when they resisted the appointment of a 
commissioner (DIA, 1 December 1999, p 4).  At this stage of the 
law reform preparations, McKinlay’s business was not to be 
finished.   
  
Even though there was to be no position-specific role clarification 
in the proposed legislative reform, the CD provides evidence of 
expectations of the overall council role relevant to my research. 
 
The elected council is defined as the governing body, with two 
“critical” relationships to manage:  with its communities, and with 
the chief executive and the organisation. Two further “major 
dimensions” identified are decision-making structures and 
processes, plus the electoral mandate. My interest is the mayor’s 
particular role within these council roles and dimensions.   
 
The CD describes in some detail the council governance role 
(relating to managing the relationship with the CEO and the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
organisation), and elements can be related to my analysis of the 
mayor’s intertwined leadership roles (community, council, and 
policy) along with the mayors’ self-analysis: 
1. Community leadership - leading and identifying 
community views, including:        
 Balancing representation of constituents interests 
against decisions in the interests of the community as a 
whole 
 Identifying community outcomes, priorities, values 
and preferences 
 Providing community consultation, participation 
and access to decision-making 
2. Policy leadership - translating community wishes into 
defined outcomes, including: 
 Stewardship of public assets, including ownership 
decisions (acquisition, sale, development choices), setting 
parameters for performance of assets 
 Agreeing council powers and functions, including 
those that are permitted but not required by legislation (eg 
to enter or exit functions or activities) 
3. Council leadership - monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
including: 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
 Evaluation of effectiveness of choice of outputs and 
other interventions 
 Systematic and reliable reporting to the community 
on performance 
In terms of decision-making structures and processes, the CD 
forecast the proposed new legislation would aim for a balance 
between prescribed statutory requirements and local discretion to 
meet local needs.    
 
Local Governance and Role Clarification 
My consideration of Cabinet Papers preparatory to the launch of 
the CD show that the 1989 silence on the role of the mayor and 
councillors was an issue, tensions were accepted as inherent and 
inevitable in representative democracy and the Rodney situation a 
consequence of such tension, and some thought was given to 
seeking public comment on the role of elected representatives.  
The elected member role – “as it has evolved through custom and 
practice” included:  
 Making policy,  
 Expressing community aspirations,  
 Overseeing the chief executive,  
 Representing the community in outside political 
relationships (10 May 2001, p 2).   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Attachments to this report record the views of Treasury, the 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED) and LGNZ, and offer 
options “to help clarify the roles and responsibilities” (pp9-10). 
LGNZ also commented: 
While the difficulty of prescribing roles and consequent 
relationships in legislation is acknowledged, the existing Act 
fails to provide the necessary guidance to contribute to 
effective and sustainable relationships between councils and 
their chief executives in many cases (p 10). 
 
LGNZ recommended the new Act – “to reduce uncertainty and 
potential for conflict” - should specify the principles underpinning 
the roles and relationships of elected members, mayors, chairs and 
chief executives, and strongly supported proposed requirements for 
a Code of Conduct “with appropriate sanctions or penalties to 
require compliance with provisions of the code” (ibid). 
 
The 10 May paper set the scene for the Consultation Document 
(published a month later) in grouping the mayor and councillors 
together as elected representatives in relation to roles and 
responsibilities, and in recognising relationship tensions, and while 
not supporting the LGNZ, Treasury and MED position on role 
clarification, left the door ajar: 
The intention to improve the clarity of roles and 
responsibilities … be stated in the public discussion 
document (p 11). 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The Changes 
During the next four weeks, my reading of two drafts of the 
Discussion Document - 28 May and 5 June (Draft Five) - show 
that sections relating to ‘mayors and councillors’ and ‘clear roles 
and responsibilities’ were rewritten, and parts deleted, including 
the 28 May reference: “confusion about roles and responsibilities 
invariably leads to conflict and dysfunction” (pp 65-66). 
 
The final Review Consultation Document (dated as June, 2001) 
emerged with both the ‘Mayors and councillors’ section and the 
proposed ‘role’ question deleted.  A graphic, showing the elected 
council as ‘mayor-councillors-chair’, is inserted.  The document 
repeats the proposal for the status quo approach of no legislative 
provisions, “because it is generally not possible to legislate for 
good governance practice”. 
 
It notes: “Guidance on governance practice would be through 
mechanisms such as Standing Orders.”  It is proposed “to 
encourage and work with the local government sector to develop 
good practice guides on local governance”, and notes the Office of 
the Controller and Auditor General published good practice 
guidelines on particular issues. 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
There is no accompanying question raised on elected members’ 
role.   Clearly, rather then presenting various options and seeking 
public discussion on the issue, the decision was made to promote 
just one perspective – the process-based governance policy option 
including the proposed Code of Conduct. This reflects the DIA 
officials view indicated at the time of the Rodney Review request 
18 months earlier.  
 
In the course of my investigation into the development of the CD, I 
have been given a range of observations and explanations both on 
and off the record. There are views that the final position reflected 
‘a direction’ from the Prime Minister, as well as a late lobby from 
‘some strong mayors’, and conversely that this was officials’ 
understanding of their Minister’s wishes. I have been unable to 
unearth any evidence in support of an interventionist or 
conspiratorial influence.  In my view, the final course simply 
reflected what had been originally charted – the DIA preference 
for guidance and guidelines as the mechanism to encourage 
effective governance, rather than legislative prescription of elected 
members’ roles.     
 
What is clear in the development of the CD, is that the views of 
Treasury, the MED, as well as LGNZ - the body representing the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
entire local government sector - were over-turned, and their 
inclination towards encouraging public discussion on the issue not 
supported.    
 
I now turn to the Bill, which as previously stated, was presented to 
Parliament on 19 December 2001. The new Local Government Act 
(LGA 2002) is due to come into force on 1 July 2003.  
 
The Local Government Bill 
On the issue of ‘governance and management’, the anticipated 
relationships/process framework is introduced (in both the Bill and 
the Act) rather than a political roles-and-responsibilities approach 
complementary to the CEO provision. Councils “must endeavour 
to ensure” a set of prescribed principles is applied to the 
governance of their local authority (s24, p 22).  This reflects the 
Rodney influence, as I have previously outlined, and fails to 
recognizes the risk of ineffectiveness in situations when there is a 
failure to abide by such principles, particularly when these 
principles are in fact a transcribing of the conventions and 
traditions associated with the governance relationship. 
 
In a new development – building on the concept of balance 
between statutory prescription and local discretion outlined in the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
CD - councils will be required following their election to prepare 
and make available publicly, a “local governance statement” 
(LGS) with 12 requirements for inclusion (s26, pp 23-24).  The 
first two requirements develop the existing provisions relating to 
the electoral system and representation applied to the district (i.e. 
wards and numbers of councillors), and opportunities to change 
them.  The rest are new and include: 
 Members’ roles and conduct  
 Governance structures and processes  
 The management structure and the relationship between 
management and elected members  
 Key approved planning and policy documents and the 
process for their development and review, and systems for public 
access to it and its elected members. 
 
These requirements are all relevant to my study.  This provision 
appears to be a comprehensive process tool, aimed at ensuring 
individual councils take charge of their own operating 
environments, and for developing the interface with their 
communities in addition to the proposed strategic community plan 
(known as the Long Term Community Plan - LTCP).   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Time will tell, but the overall LGS concept bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the United States style local government home-rule 
charter.  The major difference, however, is the omission of clarity 
in the mayors’ roles and responsibilities (along with councillors), 
and the discretion given to each council to prescribe these, albeit in 
a publicly accessible manner.  The community accountability and 
public ‘scrutiny’ process is undefined.  I will discuss this further in 
my concluding chapter.    
 
In the next chapter, I will focus on the views of the Mayors of 
1998-2001 gathered through my research questionnaire.      
 
 
NOTES 
1. As one example, Gibbons reports ‘intense battles’ between locals in 
Hamilton as the town developed during the 1870s, with ‘poison’ and ‘poisoners’ 
within the town board and then the new borough council.  He refers to  ‘political 
contortions’, factions and personal vendettas, and ‘nest-feathering’.  Within 
meetings, there were accusations of not telling the truth, requests for members 
to be removed, councillors ‘stalking out …in disgust and rage’, and minutes 
note ‘great tumult arose’ (Gibbons, 1977, pp 69-80). 
 
2. Paradise Reforged -James Belich, 2001, p 17. 
 
3. Peter Gibbons opens his history of Hamilton – Astride the River (1977) – 
by referring to its foundation as ‘a small imperial outpost in conquered territory 
during 1864’…gaining independent municipal status in 1877. 
 
4. Paradise Reforged – James Belich, 2001, p 20.  
 
5. Eleven of the mayors present were re-elected to office for the 1998-2001 
term, and have participated in my research project. John Wilson was defeated.  
 
6. My own experience from 1989-96 had involved three CEOs (plus one 
acting), as well as council moves to establish the Deputy Mayor position as 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
‘Leader of the Opposition’, and unsuccessful attempts to challenge even my 
primus inter pares role in both the employment and performance monitoring of 
CEOs. This was in part resolved by my council’s adoption in 1995 of the first 
‘roles and responsibilities’ policy for the mayor, deputy mayor and council 
chairpeople, a practice that continues today, although in my view it has been 
largely ineffectual in guiding behaviours.  In 2002 (with a different mayor and 
council – but five of the 13 councillors remaining from my time), Hamilton City 
Council is strongly and publicly divided, with the majority (including all five of 
the councillors from my time) publicly committed to confining the mayor to a 
powerless ‘lame duck’ role.  
 
7. Following her 2000 resignation as LGNZ president, Louise Rosson 
retired at the 2001 elections from regional government (where she had held the 
chairperson’s role), opting to stand instead as a mayoral candidate. She was 
unsuccessful. 
 
8. The Bill was enacted by Parliament on Friday, 20 December 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
THE VIEWS OF NEW ZEALAND MAYORS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter my focus is on New Zealand mayors. I begin by 
defining the mayoral role, and then present an analysis of mayors’ 
views gathered through the research questionnaire.  The 
investigation framework featured three planes:  the mayors’ 
experiences of the leadership role trinity (community, council and 
policy), the impact of collegial relationships and conflict on the 
executing of those roles, and difficulties related to the lack of 
legislative prescription.  The planes echo the triangle of issues that 
had emerged for mayors during the 1990s: roles, relationships, and 
the need for clarity in the functions of governance.   
 
 
The mayors were the primary empirical resource for this research, 
being able to present a first-hand viewpoint in what is largely 
uncharted and undocumented territory.   
 
The purpose was to determine what it was that impeded mayors from 
fulfilling their role and executing their leadership functions, and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
whether there was merit in defining their role in legislation.  The 
investigation would also increase the scholarship about mayors and 
local leadership.  
 
 
If there was to be a solid foundation for mayoral role definition, it 
was important first to ‘explore and clarify’ what that role was and 
what it was not (Howell, McDermott and Forgie, 1995, p vii).  It was 
also important to move outside the ‘ideal’ theoretical orientation of 
public policy thinking as exhibited by Department of Internal Affairs 
officials during the 1999-2001 review (and outlined in the previous 
chapter), and consider the real situations mayors face in practice - 
applying the role, executing the functions, encountering the 
challenges.    
  
 
The 1996-97 Rangitikei situation and the 1999-2000 Rodney case 
indicated that the tradition associated with the mayor’s office was 
rendered powerless when confronted by uncivil behaviour.  The 
tools of meeting procedure and standing orders were ineffective.  
There was no recognition of mayoral authority, despite assignment 
to the mayoral office by the ‘general will of the majority’ -the 
electorate (Magill, 1995, p 724).  In these instances, Elwood’s 
‘time-honoured’ conventions had proven ineffective, undermined 
by ‘difficulties in interpersonal relationships’. Councillors would 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
not be ‘managed’ by the mayor as envisaged in the Review 
Authority’s (2000) subsequent definition of mayoral responsibility. 
 
Based on his experience at Rodney, Armstrong recommended 
statutory role definition for the office of mayor, with a particular 
focus on both political and policy leadership.  Mayor Law - with a 
different set of colleagues and circumstances - supports legislative 
clarity of the mayor’s policy leadership function.   
 
This chapter explores the grounds for legislative prescription of the 
mayoral role through an analysis of the survey of mayors’ views I 
conducted in 2001.  
 
 
SECTION ONE   
Mayoral Leadership 
The analysis of responses showed mayors, ranging from the long 
serving to first-termers, considered themselves captains and 
navigators of the local ship of state.  They viewed political 
leadership, policy leadership, and community leadership as 
significant functions (and responsibilities), important for effective 
governance and accountability.   
 
In this section I begin by defining the core functional elements of 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
each of the three leadership roles.  There is overlap across these 
leadership categories, reflecting the cross-cutting nature of 
leadership roles and responsibilities. The key functional elements 
were chosen on the basis of my observation of the tradition role 
together with contemporary mayoral practice disclosed through the 
1997 Mayors’ Forum and from my 2001 questionnaire responses. I 
also drew on the June 2001 Review Consultation Document (CD), 
and the Rodney Review.   
 
The result is a comprehensive job description of key functions and 
key responsibilities, based on practice and expectations, but not 
legitimised in law.  
 
After setting the scene with the three leadership role definitions, I 
move on to the mayors’ responses, using verbatim quotes to 
illustrate mayoral practices and the restraints encountered, and to 
canvass the rationale for legislative role clarity. 
 
Definitions 
1. Political Leadership 
 The role of presiding member or chairperson of the council, 
in accordance with tradition and convention, assumes a 
requirement for the executing of leadership to the council 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
(the local authority as a whole), and to its elected members.  
This is the ceremonial chair and leader of the council, the 
civic and council leadership role – according to the 1997 
Mayors’ Forum summary.  The chairing of the council is the 
only role authenticated by legislation. The authors of the 
Rodney Review refer to the mayor as ‘the focal point for 
fellow councillors’. In meetings, this leadership function 
requires the mayor to manage elected member relationships 
and behaviour in accordance with Standing Orders and a 
Code of [expected] Conduct. However the presiding 
member role goes beyond the function of presiding at 
council meetings, and incorporates the leader’s authority to 
influence council decision-making processes.  
 The mayor ‘leads’ council agenda setting, the monitoring of 
council business, the evaluation of its effectiveness, and the 
reporting to the community (in accordance with 
requirements for transparency and openness).  This requires 
collaboration with committee chairpeople (who together 
make up the council’s political executive group or Cabinet) 
and the CEO (the council’s primary advisor).   
 Just as the CEO is responsible for establishing the 
administrative structure and its management, the mayor 
‘leads’ the setting up of the political organizational structure 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
and its management through the appointment of committees 
and the allocation of sub-leader roles including the deputy 
mayor and committee chairpeople. This mayoral function 
relates to the delegation and division of council’s political 
business to committees, and the management of those 
committees (and their members) to produce cohesive results 
in accordance with council policy and statutory 
requirements. Again paralleling the CEO responsibility for 
staff, the mayor is the leader of councillors, with a 
requirement to ensure agreed tasks and activities are 
undertaken by those councillors and the council’s 
committees within a delegation framework, and performance 
is monitored.  This function also involves the management 
of relationships and behaviour, and of the political tensions 
and conflicting factions within the elected members as a 
group.   
 Overseeing the CEO is a principal role of governance, and 
includes all matters related to the CEO’s employment and 
performance monitoring. The mayor is the political ‘leader’ 
in the council-administration interface, complementing the 
CEO as the administrative ‘leader’, in accordance with the 
1988 state sector model of Minister/CEO.  The mayor 
‘leads’ the management of the council’s relationship with 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
the CEO, and is responsible for ensuring the CEO 
implements the council’s policies. 
 As the council leader, the mayor is responsible for ensuring 
the council acts in accordance with its statutory 
responsibilities, upholds the public interest, and displays the 
highest standards of ethical conduct, ensuring the 
community has justifiable trust and confidence in the 
integrity of its local government.  
 This function also involves stewardship in relation to 
council’s public assets, and setting the parameters for the 
performance of these assets – an aspect also linked to the 
policy leadership role.  The new Section 12 (LGA-2002, p 
20) provision for general powers - known as the power of 
general competence - enables councils to enter or exit 
functions or activities, subject to public consultation 
procedures. Although again it is not specified, the mayor 
will ‘lead’ this process  – a role that brings together the 
political, policy and community leadership functions. 
 In the public reporting context, the mayor is the primary 
spokesperson for the council. This entails the mayor – as the 
titular council leader - speaking for the council, to articulate 
publicly council actions and policies. This is different from 
the mayor’s function to speak as mayor – as the holder of the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
office and a ‘free agent’ ultimately accountable to the 
electorate (Salter/Doogan, 1997, p 4). This also applies to 
community leadership.   
 
   2.  Policy Leadership 
 The role of policy leadership, unwritten in law, is taken as 
‘translating community aspirations into defined outcomes’ 
(CD, 2001, p 24). It includes the function “to acknowledge, 
value and respond to the diversity of interests and rights of 
local citizens and groups of citizens”, and with “partnership, 
community consultation, and open communication” (p 20).   
 Specifically, the mayor ‘leads’ the council in preparing key 
policy documents such as the post-1989 Annual Plans and 
Annual Reports, resource management-based District Plans, 
and Strategic Plans.  The 2002 legislation now also requires 
Long Term Plans, Local Governance Statements, and 
Triennial Agreements.  
 This function is an influence process using the political 
structure and personnel established through the mayor’s 
political leadership, and therefore these two roles are inter-
related.  The mayor executes policy leadership by bringing 
issues to the attention of elected members and the CEO, for 
decision-making consideration, and influencing 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
consideration of the issues brought by others. The mayor 
‘leads’ the communication process from the community to 
the council, within the council, between the administration 
and the council, and from the council back to the 
community.     
 Policy leadership, as a process, also includes the monitoring 
of the CEO to ensure policy implementation and application, 
effectiveness and review, functions that also link with the 
council political leadership function.  
  
3.  Community Leadership 
 The function of community leadership is grounded in past 
tradition and convention. For mayors, it is based on success 
in elections. Mayors are ultimately accountable to the 
electorate through the ballot box (Salter/Doogan, 1997, p 4). 
This leadership role places the mayor as the chief of the 
community tribe, the first citizen or citizen ‘leader’, 
expected to execute a wide and complex range of functions 
exemplified by the following: ceremonial purposes; 
networking, strategising, and promoting the district and the 
well-being of its people; consulting, facilitating, and 
resolving individual citizen problems; the ‘boss’ of the 
council for advocacy and ‘last resort’ appeals.  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
 In addition to identifying and representing community views 
and voicing them in council policy and decision-making 
processes (as council’s political and policy leader), the 
mayor’s community leadership function also entails ‘giving 
a lead’ to the community. This two-way community 
leadership involves balancing the representation of citizens’ 
(constituents) interests (as individuals or groups) against 
decisions in the interests of the community as a whole, and 
requires the identification of community priorities, values 
and preferences, and outcomes (CD, 2001, p 25).  In this 
context, the mayor is able to ‘lead’ as community leader 
(representing the community), and as council leader 
(representing the council).   
 In this role, the mayor also ‘leads’ the application of 
mandatory community consultation, participation and access 
to decision-making.  This is linked with the political 
leadership role and the requirement for council transparency 
and openness, as well as the policy leadership role with its 
requirement for reporting to the public.  It also relates to 
democratic principles and expectations, through the mayor’s 
leadership role and responsibilities to uphold the integrity of 
local government and public service ethics, and preserve 
public interest over individual and personal interest (both 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
within council and in the community). 
 In executing the role of community leadership, the mayor is 
generally a ‘free agent’ (Salter/Doogan, ibid). 
 
The Role of the Mayor 
The questionnaire examined the mayors’ experience of the roles of 
political leadership (as the presiding member of council), policy 
leadership and community leadership. I have tailored my 
presentation into sections based on each of the three leadership 
roles, with anonymity when requested. 
 
1.  Political Leadership 
Political leadership includes the presiding member function as 
council chairperson (and leader), with responsibility for 
establishing and managing the political structure and processes, the 
appointment of the Deputy Mayor and committee chairpeople, the 
overseeing of the CEO and the political-administrative interface, 
and the role of primary spokesperson for the council. It is in the 
political leadership role that the mayor is the primary guardian of 
the public interest.  
 
 The Role of Chairperson 
The first formal task for incoming councils (and mayors) comes 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
with the inaugural meeting following the triennial general election, 
and as set out in Section 114D of the Local Government Act 
(1974).  It is at this meeting that the mayor and councillors are 
sworn in and attest the declaration required in the statute.  The 
statute (s 101N) provides for the presiding member of the council 
to be ‘a mayor’ (territorial authority) or ‘a chairperson’ (regional 
council).  It is also traditional at the inaugural meeting that 
councils resolve their political structure and framework with the 
establishment of their committee format and memberships. 
Councils have the statutory power to set up standing, special and 
joint committees and subcommittees. The council (not the mayor) 
also appoints the deputy mayor and committee chairpeople. 
 
The mayors ranked the role of council chairperson as most 
important.  Chairing council was ranked 8-10 (on a scale of 0-10) 
by 93 per cent of the mayors. Only one mayor ranked it lower than 
7 (at 4) (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 - Role of Chairperson
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Mayors gave even higher priority to the responsibility for 
determining the council’s committee structure - currently a council 
function - with 95 per cent stating this was a key mayoral role.   
 
 
 Choosing the Committee Structure, and the Team Leaders: 
 
The mayors reported that they attempted to take the lead in 
establishing committees and committee membership, and in 
choosing committee chairpeople and the deputy mayor.   
 
That 95 per cent of the sample of mayors gave the establishment of 
the political executive structure such high importance as a function 
that should be explicitly the mayor’s, is a clear indication of the 
impact they consider the current process has on council politics 
and effective governance.  
 
Some mayors did have the ‘authority’ to ‘lead’ council in this 
process, and did just that, considering this an important aspect of 
the political leadership role:  
You [the mayor] have to delegate the ability and the 
responsibility; you have to delegate to the right person to 
represent you, not just the council; you should decide who 
that is (Mayor Noel Pope, Tauranga). 
  
 
Others, though, faced significant difficulty in exercising this role, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
and drew attention to problems caused when dealing with 
established councils reluctant to support newly elected mayors. 
One mayor who described the inaugural council meeting as “like 
moving the Rock of Gibraltar” was typical.  The previous mayor 
had been defeated, the ‘old guard’ councillors were strongly 
supported by the chief executive, the meeting was “already 
organised …and I had no say at the end of the day.”  This mayor 
talked of strong internal politics involving councillors and the 
CEO “which was all about their efforts to retain power and 
control”.9  Another commented that: 
It’s easy to become completely isolated, walking into an 
established organisation, particularly if they supported the 
previous mayor and you are different. 
 
 
Most mayors had the experience of opposition and political 
maneuvering including ousted mayors being voted in as deputy 
mayor and ‘opposition leaders’ given executive committee 
positions. It is in committees that much of the business of council 
occurs, and committee chairpeople are sub-leaders in the 
administrative interface, influencing the selection of agenda items 
and the outcome of deliberations. When chairpeople represent 
councillor opposition to the mayor, the mayor’s ability to execute 
council leadership across a wide variety of council activities was 
undermined. Mayors, therefore, did report endeavouring to 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
influence the establishment of committees and appointment of 
chairpeople.  The point here is that access to committee chair roles 
and membership majorities is a way of acquiring power in the 
council, and it is a “numbers game”.  A majority vote of 
councillors must be secured for appointments, even when the 
traditional authority of the mayor is respected.   
 
Typically, the executing of this leadership function was expressed 
by a process of ‘talking through’ and ‘seeking consensus’ before 
the inaugural council meeting where the formal resolutions were 
made, and with ‘give-and-take’ parameters. Mayors reported that, 
ultimately, they were dependent on collegial relationships and 
majority support to achieve their preferred committee structures 
and chair appointments. Hauraki Mayor (and LGNZ President) 
Basil Morrison was among those who stressed the value of post-
election council retreats from the outset to develop these 
relationships and “put the team together”. Relationship building 
was reported as being the primary objective of these retreats: 
It’s a good time to have a few beers, get to know one another 
and develop that personal relationship which is critical in my 
view to putting it together. 
 
The agenda also included consideration of how councillors should 
manage their roles as elected members, the legal responsibilities, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
policy issues and plans. 
 
Selecting the deputy mayor was also reported as being inherently 
fraught with conflict. The likelihood of conflict was determined by 
whether the majority on the council supported the mayor, and how 
they viewed the role of the deputy mayor.  One mayor 
encapsulated the typical view:  
Ideally the mayor would select a person that would support 
the mayor and not undermine the position. 
 
 
This mayor quoted the need for numbers and the aversion to being 
put into the “lame duck” position10.  Another mayor who admitted 
to “an awful time”, said she delegated little work to the council-
chosen deputy mayor - “which is a pity and rather exhausting for 
me” – and chose a surrogate deputy instead, “to bounce ideas off”.   
 
Mayors commonly referred to the council appointment process as 
a negotiation with ‘trading’ involved: 
For a new mayor it can be difficult to have the numbers.  My 
deputy mayor was a compromise, to ensure that the person 
who really wanted to make it difficult for me didn’t come 
through. 
 
 
Long-serving Opotiki Mayor Don Riesterer said he always tried to 
recommend “the best person” as deputy mayor,  “but most times I 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
don’t win”. Yet he was typical of the mayors who used give-and-
take tactics.  He reported ‘trading’ with the council to win support 
for an overall streamlined structure as a mechanism to improve 
governance, reduce costs and tensions. 
 
Mayor Hamish Kynoch (Central Hawkes Bay) reported trading off 
his deputy mayor preference for the right to nominate committee 
chairpeople and determine committee membership. Kynoch’s 
views differed from the majority of mayors, and he regarded the 
deputy mayor “as being the creature of council – the deputy mayor 
of the council, rather than the mayor’s deputy”. However it is 
important to note that his comments need to be balanced by his 
assertion assertion of leadership (and authority) over the 
committees.  
 
Law expressed the only strong view against a mayoral role in the 
establishment of committees and the selection of a deputy.  He was 
emphatic about both committee chairpeople and the deputy mayor 
being the council’s choice, but in his case a key factor was an open 
and ethical process dependent on goodwill, and he led this process. 
Law’s emphasis on inclusiveness is understandable: he and his 
council undertook their appointments in the aftermath of the 
sacking of the previous council - the consequence of council 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
dysfunctionalism in which such appointments had been identified 
by the Rodney Review Authority as an influencing factor.  Law’s 
description of his council’s process reflected the reviewers’ 
“Lessons from the Rodney Experience” (October, 2000), that 
appointments “should be based on the needs of the council and not 
be used to accord status or recognition of individual elected 
members” (Bickers, 2000, p 22).    
 
This issue of the manipulation of the political structure for 
individual councillor remuneration and prestige was pinpointed by 
a number of mayors. Remuneration - higher for chairpeople and 
the deputy mayor – was an influencing factor, and mayors reported 
its use by majority groups as patronage to bestow dollar rewards 
and status, and to glue opposition against the mayor (and vice 
versa). To counter this, almost 20percent of the mayors referred to 
their endeavours to reduce the number of committees and therefore 
chairpeople and meetings. They variously described their 
motivation to “reduce costs and politics”, to “stop the merry-go-
round”, and “to close down the lolly factory”. The purpose was 
more effective governance.11    
 
 The Chief Executive Relationship 
The relationship between the mayor and the chief executive was 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
acknowledged to be of primary importance by the mayors.  
 
 
The 1989 local government reforms inserted a new Section 119D 
into the amended Local Government Act (1974) outlining the 
responsibilities of the CEO, requiring them to: 
 Implement the decisions of the local authority 
 Provide advice to members of the local authority and any 
community boards 
 Ensure that all delegated functions, duties, and powers are 
properly performed or exercised 
 Ensure the effective, efficient, and economic management of 
the activities and planning of the local authority  
 Employ staff of the local authority and negotiate their terms 
of employment. 
As a consequence of these provisions, mayors have important 
relationships with CEOs. More than half of the mayors ranked this 
relationship the maximum10 on a scale of importance, with a 
further third ranking it 9 and 9-10, and overall 100 per cent 8-10  
(Figure 2).   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Figure 2 - CEO
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The relationship is complex.  Waipa Mayor John Hewitt used the 
following description:   
It is not a partnership, master/servant, advisor/client, 
coach/player, employer/employee, buyer/seller, or any other 
prescribed relationship, but is a weird mixture of them all. 
 
This importance of the CEO relationship was confirmed when 
compared with other issues, as I shall further outline at the end of 
this section. 
 
 
Most mayors reporting difficulties with this relationship at some 
time sought anonymity, and it is not possible to detail some of 
these situations without disclosing the ‘who’ and ‘where’.  Many 
noted that their references were related to the local government 
sector as a whole, not just their own home patches. Overall, the 
core difficulties disclosed by the mayors about their relationships 
with CEOs related to the governance/management interface, role 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
understanding (and application), and performance monitoring in a 
political environment.   
 
When there was a combination of a difficult relationship with the 
CEO, a non-supportive or volatile council (or even just one or two 
councillors) and a politically laced internal staff environment, 
mayors reported that they became isolated.  Responses to such 
difficulties ranged from relationship-development strategies to 
manoeuvres to oust CEOs. The situation – the current climate – 
carried no assumption that convention ensured a positive 
relationship with mayoral role respect.  Rather there was an 
expectation that a positive mayor/CEO relationship required 
nurturing, and the CEO’s attitude and behaviour could be 
inhibiting.  Rotorua Mayor Grahame Hall summed it up: 
It’s absolutely important.  Council will not function 
satisfactorily if the mayor/CEO relationship is not right. 
   
 
One mayor (who wished to remain anonymous with the following 
comment) was typical of the many who referred to the importance 
of balance in the political/administrative relationship, and the need 
to give statutory weight to the political side:   
The CEO is placed by legislation in a very powerful position.  
It has taken two years to develop an effective relationship.  
Early interactions were ‘warfare’. My management 
experience helped.  Without this the relationship may never 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
have been turned.  CEOs can use ‘governance’ as a means of 
keeping council from exercising their responsibility for the 
health and direction of the organisation. This legislation 
needs review to empower councils.    
 
 
 
Mayor Claire Stewart (New Plymouth) used the term “vital” to 
describe the CEO relationship. She emphasised the political 
accountability the mayor faces – in “the interface between 
governance and management” – by commenting: 
The mayor’s role is full-time and extremely complex.  I have 
to keep an eye on decisions made … the mayor is 
accountable for everyone and for everything.   We need to 
work together. 
 
Her comment implied a strong sense of accountability for the 
performance of the CEO. 
 
A number of mayors commented that many CEOs had ‘moved on’ 
during the 1990s, and I am aware of many difficult circumstances. 
An evaluation of the reasons is beyond the scope of this research, 
but it is clear to me that the lack of statutory recognition of 
mayoral authority in the CEO/council governance relationship is a 
core issue. The lack of such recognition can constrain or even 
preclude the proper overseeing and management of CEOs by their 
employer (the council). Failure to control bureaucratic domination 
increases the risk of CEO authority upsetting the balance required 
for effective governance, and the consequence can be CEOs 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
assuming elements of the mayor’s leadership role. CEOs, too, can 
be undermined in the absence of a clear individual partner in the 
employing council, as the Rodney case illustrated.  There, as one 
mayor observed, even the ‘strong’ CEO was incapacitated by 
uncivil and improper behaviours by councillors: 
The mayor had become intimidated and the CEO turned to 
jelly. 
  
 
In my time as mayor, there was no national employment contract 
template to apply to incoming CEOs, and mayors (me included) 
relied on their mayoral peers as well as consultants to develop 
council-specific contractual and performance monitoring 
procedures.  The 1989 Section 119D provision - outlined earlier – 
has no reference to mayors.  Under the current arrangements, 
mayors can be voted out of any role in CEO management and 
monitoring, losing all leadership authority in this key interface, the 
result being in-house resistance and paralysis of the mayor’s 
political and policy leadership.  
 
The CEOs’ statutory staff employment role also impacts on the 
functioning of the mayoral office. With almost all mayors 
reporting working around 60 hours and seven days a week, staff 
support resources were viewed as a key efficiency and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
effectiveness factor in ensuring these mayors “keep on top of the 
workload”. Lack of staff support resources was an issue for one 
group of mayors.   
 
The Rangitikei case – in which the council reduced the mayor’s 
support services (staff, office and expenses) – illustrates the 
potential for isolating and disabling the office of the mayor. This 
lack of support for the mayor could be overcome by ensuring the 
CEO has authority and responsibility for ensuring appropriate 
support services for the mayor’s office.   
 
Another aspect concerned CEOs’ employment and performance 
monitoring of the people who will ‘work’ for mayors in the role of 
secretary or personal assistant (PA). Although some reported 
CEOs who carried out this role collaboratively, the weaker 
position of the mayor in the ability to appoint support staff was 
exemplified in the following comment: 
I only have one executive assistant.  This situation is not 
adequate but I am not going to change it until after the 
elections.  At that time, I hope that the chief executive officer 
will reassess the situation. 
   
 
Office accommodation emerged as an associated issue, and again 
mayors were dependent on CEOs.  Around a third of the mayors 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
commented on the positive impact of the physical ‘executive’ 
environment when they had offices adjoining, opposite or nearby 
the CEO’s, and shared PAs.  Morrison, who confirmed the 
common view that the CEO relationship was “critical”, said office 
location was “so important”: 
Our offices are across the hall, we are only about nine steps 
apart and we walk in and out of one another’s office – 
‘here’s a problem what do you think’? You’ve got to be 
together. 
 
 
These issues pinpoint the importance of mayoral role clarification, 
to update the office-to-office governance relationship (mayor to 
CEO), and to legitimise what is in essence mayoral authority based 
on convention, tuning it to today’s situation and circumstances. 
This is not expansion of the mayor’s role. It is a re-assertion of an 
historic foundation that has been eroded through the restructuring 
of local government in 1989.  The authority prescribed then for 
CEOs requires a complementary provision for the elected council, 
and therefore the mayor specifically, to bring statutory balance to 
the governance equation and counter bureaucratic power and 
control. There should be specific reference to the mayoral leader 
function of overseeing the CEO. Further, the 2002 provision for 
staff leadership by the CEO should be balanced by a new provision 
requiring council leadership by the mayor. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
 Council spokesperson 
Traditionally it is the mayor who speaks publicly ‘for’ the council 
to ‘keep the community informed’, and the office holder is also 
expected to ‘give a lead’ on key issues as the ‘first citizen’. The 
mayor’s role as the primary spokesperson for the council spans 
both the council’s operations and community engagement.  This 
role was ranked 8-10 in importance by 88 per cent of the mayors 
(Figure 3), and was identified as a sensitive issue in three areas – 
bureaucratic power, councillor opposition, and media 
relationships. 
 
Figure 3 - Primary Spokesperson
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Speechmaking, responding to media inquiries, and council 
publications were identified as communication channels. In the 
absence of role specificity and legitimised authority, mayors’ 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
ability to use these channels was often undermined by the actions 
of councillors and staff, although many reported that they used a 
variety of strategies to circumvent such obstacles. 
 
Council resistance to mayors having a high profile in the media 
was a common experience of the mayors in the sample. Riesterer 
encapsulated the comments of many:   
The public, the community, elects the mayor and expects 
them to speak out both for council and for themselves.   
Some councillors would rate this role lower. 
   
 
One mayor noted that “some councillors don’t like me getting 
publicity – but the primary spokesperson role is what you are there 
for – that’s what the community expects”.  This mayor had a 
highly politicised environment – “lots of politics within the 
building with some staff promoting their favourite councillors”.  
Council publications “never” included reference to the mayor.  
This comment illustrates the multi-faceted nature of the mayoral 
spokesperson role: the mayor speaks as the mayor and community 
leader (the ‘free agent’ beholden only to the electorate) and also as 
council leader (representing the council and bound by its 
established protocols). 
 
Mayoral leadership responsibility for Annual Plans was supported 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
by 84 per cent of the mayors, and for Annual Reports by 88 per 
cent. Though others may control ‘wordsmithing’, 98 per cent 
accepted the role of preparing the introductory comments for these 
reports (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 - Plans
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Annual Plan
Intro
Annual Report
Yes
No
 
 
 
This signature or sign-off function relates to their spokesperson 
leadership role on behalf of their councils rather than mayoral 
endorsement of the contents. It can be interpreted publicly as 
mayoral authorship, with associated mayoral leadership 
accountability, when in law and in fact, the documents are the 
products of their councils. I discuss this further in the policy 
leadership section.   
 
Council publications and media releases are subject to editorial 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
control - by both councillors and staff. Such public statements may 
be made in the mayor’s name but mayors reported occasions when 
they had little or no authority over the contents. It was in this 
context that mayors reported concerns about the strength of their 
bureaucracy to determine the nature of mayoral statements, and 
their own sense of role responsibility when speaking for their 
councils rather than for themselves.   
 
 
In my study, more than two-thirds of the mayors gave significance 
to media impact on their role (and just over half also ranked highly 
‘inadequate reporting’ of their role by the media).  They were 
acutely aware of the media’s role as an information resource for 
their constituents, and acknowledged that media representatives 
generally subscribed to the mayor’s traditional spokesperson role.   
 
Opposition from councillors and council staff to the mayors 
adopting a high media profile reflected the political environment in 
local government and the erosion of the traditional mayoral role.  
 
Mayoral leadership on both the political and public fronts can be 
undermined by weakening the mayor’s abilities to make public 
statements.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
This again raises the issue of clarification of roles in the 
political/administrative interface, and the further question of 
accountability (and ethics) in council controls over the mayor’s 
‘freedom’ of speech.12  
 
 Influences  
In my experience, the political or council leadership role was the 
most problematic for mayors.  To further evaluate this area, I 
asked mayors to rank a range of issues and their impact on the 
execution of their role within their councils, using a scale 0-10 
(Figure 5).  
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Figure 5 - Factors Impacting
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Mayors acknowledged the most important factor influencing their 
political leadership was the relationship with the CEO, with 60 per 
cent of the mayors ranking this a 10 (the highest individual score 
over all factors), and all mayors scoring this in the 7-10 range.  
 
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Almost one of every two mayors ranked at 10 the influence of 
goodwill from councillors and the deputy mayor.  Goodwill from a 
majority of councillors, and council’s acceptance of the role of the 
mayor were the two next highest ranked influences.  Almost one in 
every four mayors ranked disharmony and conflict highly (7-10), 
and one in six, the impact of council dysfunctionalism, illustrating 
the robustness of the political environment in councils, and the 
challenges to mayoral leadership.   
 
 
 
Knowledge of but not necessarily reliance on standing orders, 
influence (‘steering’) rather than domination, inclusiveness and 
focus, went hand-in-hand with tenacity and carefully thought-out 
tactics as most mayors strategised to establish their authority by 
wooing their colleagues to walk a harmonious path in council 
affairs.   
I need to stand up, regardless of the impact on me – even if 
I’d probably be better off.  It’s long haul stuff, and taking the 
team with you. And I think you get more respect than if you 
take the easy road, particularly if it is something that has got 
to be done, or would be, some time. It’s leadership (Mayor 
Gordon Blake, South Waikato). 
 
 
Invercargill Mayor Tim Shadbolt, whose mayoral experience 
includes “a massacre, with characters who fight you toe- to- toe”, 
said councils were “totally dependent on the personalities.”    His 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
recipe for executing council leadership is to use the “political 
solutions” of discussion and debate: 
You have to run the full gamut of the dynamics of politics. 
You use every means at your disposal; debate and 
confrontation, diplomacy and groveling, counselling by key 
outside parties and subtle forms of pressure, avoidance and 
going to great lengths to work around them; psychological 
and emotional tactics.   
 
 
Overall, the mayors reported attempting to execute political 
leadership in an environment permeated by challenge and political 
conflict. They were dependent on goodwill in the absence of the 
traditional authority associated with the mayoral position. Their 
effectiveness depended on their crafting of influence through the 
development of relationships.     
 
 
2. Policy Leadership 
Policy leadership - ‘translating community wishes into defined 
outcomes’ - involves both initiating and developing policy.  Its 
effective execution depends on the political leadership role as well 
as the monitoring of the CEO’s performance – because of the 
CEO’s functions to provide advice and implement decisions. The 
policy leadership role also brings the function of primary 
spokesperson, and relates closely to the community leadership 
function (as I will discuss in that section to follow).   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
In my questionnaire, policy leadership was ranked highly at 8-10 
by 84 per cent of the mayors, and only one mayor scored it lowly 
at 1 (Figure 6).   
 
 
Figure 6 - Policy Leadership
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Policy leadership was described as involving two-way 
communication in which the leader ‘knows’ and is known by their 
community and has processes for taking the lead in determining 
appropriate policies to promote the wellbeing of these 
communities.  Kynoch was typical:   “My role has been to ensure 
the various strands of community aspiration and concern are 
considered in the drafting [of the annual plan].”    
 
 
The development of Strategic Plans during the 1990s became a 
commonly accepted process by which councils gathered community 
visions for the future, subjected them to council scrutiny, and 
translated them into policy and projects.  Annual Plans, also 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
requiring public consultation, set out specific projects, programmes, 
and budget intentions for the year ahead.  Policy ‘sign-off’ is a 
commonly accepted mayoral function (as outlined in the previous 
section). 
 
One mayor refused to sign off a major policy matter immediately 
after election and went on to gain the support of the new council 
against the original decision, using this strategy to claim leadership 
authority.   
I realised how important it would be to put an early stamp as 
it were on the council. This was a good start for me and the 
new council. 
 
 
Blake exemplified mayors who supported mayoral responsibility 
for the draft Annual Plan and Annual Report, the Strategic Plan 
and District Plan.  
The buck stops with the mayor. The mayor leads, with input 
from the Chief Executive and the professional staff.  The 
mayor takes it [plans] to the community.   
 
The annual report particularly rests with me. I’ve got to take 
responsibility. That rests with me - if we haven’t performed, 
if we’ve gone astray, if we are failing.  It’s a high 
responsibility. 
  
 
While this policy leadership role was given significant importance 
by mayors, its execution has no legitimised foundation within 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
councils.  
 
Mayors reported high community expectations that they would 
“give a strong lead on a wide range of issues and particularly the 
big issues” (Masterton Mayor Bob Francis). The mayors reported, 
though, that they could only achieve this with the support of the 
council. Policy leadership, then, involved bringing issues to 
council and then influencing their consideration. The mayors 
commented that traditional community expectations of mayoral 
leadership were not matched by council respect for this mayoral 
function. As with political leadership, mayors had to assert and 
earn the policy leadership function in the absence of role clarity.  
Mayors generally emphasized the importance of instituting 
effective procedures for policy development. These were described 
as an important means for gathering support for their leadership, 
thus enabling them to take the lead.  
 
 
Stewart, for example, emphasized quality “process”. By this she 
meant an expectation of good quality papers prepared by staff and 
subjected to pre-agenda briefings with the mayor and in some 
cases committee chairpeople. She commented:  
This allows me to test for political acceptance and 
acknowledges the fact that the mayor is far more 
knowledgeable about the community than other councillors, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
because the mayor is full-time, and accountable for everyone 
and everything. 
 
 
Harvey initially won support for his internationally recognised 
‘EcoCity’ policy by “presenting the facts” and insisting to 
councillors “who certainly were not greenies”, that “you would be 
crazy not to go with this.”   And he retained this policy through 
stormy times and new terms by “closing the door and saying I 
want to talk straight with you …don’t pull the guts out of 
something that is working so well, don’t wreck it.”   
 
One mayor illustrated the linkage between council, policy and 
community leadership:   
A vision must be sold to council.  I take the lead in all policy 
and planning activity – facilitating council.  This involves 
determining themes, key parameters and projects.  The role 
of spokesperson is a key mayoral function and tool.   I may 
liaise with others but only if I deem it necessary.  It is made 
clear if I am talking for council or for myself.  Council find 
this acceptable but it has been the subject of debate – 
particularly when publishing my annual review of council 
performance. 
 
This mayor is typical of those who grasped the leadership mantle, 
but again confirms the demise of traditional protections, the 
ongoing need for incumbents to assert their leader functions in the 
absence of legitimised authority, and the complex leader 
spokesperson role. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
3.   Community Leadership 
Community leadership is the representation function, including 
ceremonial functions and community engagement, the gathering of 
community ‘voices’ and the upholding of statutory community 
participatory process.  It involves leadership on behalf of, and for 
the community.   
 
Mayors ranked the role highly (Figure 7). Of the three leadership 
roles I have identified, it attracted the highest number of top 
rankings (10). 
Figure 7 - Community Leader
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As a further example, the mayors’ summary of community 
expectations of their leadership role illustrates the status given the 
position in their experience, and the expectations that the mayor’s 
office is the highest point of authority and community advocacy 
(Figure 8).   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Figure 8 - Role Expectations
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Mayors overwhelmingly identified their role as ‘the head of 
council’, giving this role an average ranking of 9.4 on the 0-10 
scale, and two-thirds ranking it a full top 10.    
 
The second highest ranking went to the role as ‘community 
advocate’, with a 9.4 average, and almost half scoring it a 10. 
Other community leader roles ranked highly by individual mayors 
included:  patron, funding application approver, career advisor, 
listener, shoulder to cry on, facilitator/networker, and role model.  
 
Although connected with the mayor’s political and policy roles, 
the community leadership role stands outside the council 
operation.  It implies leading the people, a position founded on 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
ancient tradition; the trials and tribulations of the people, as well as 
celebrations and successes, are brought to the office.      
  
In outlining the types and frequency of issues brought to their 
attention by constituents, the mayors confirmed – in practice – the 
expectation voiced by Francis that they would ‘give the lead’ on a 
wide range of issues, many of them related to central government 
functions, not local government (Figure 9).   
 
 
Figure 9 - Issues & Frequency
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Most mayors referred to high community expectations of 
leadership combined with assumptions that the role came with 
significant powers.  Morrison – with 30 years experience behind 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
him – viewed community leadership as “being in touch” and 
“having linkage with your community” in order to meet 
community expectations “and make a positive difference to 
people’s lives”. He considered that “most people think the mayor 
can walk on water and do anything”, and the public demanded 
leadership at both community and council level.  The term 
‘idealistic’ was used by some rather than ‘unrealistic’. A 
significant number of mayors were approached regularly on 
immigration, social welfare, health and education matters, 
although these were central rather than local government 
functions.    
 
Some mayors spoke of the key role they undertook in promoting 
their districts, and the value they brought to community events and 
community fund-raising projects.   Three mayors - Harvey, 
Stewart, and Francis - recalled the impact on their role of three 
high profile police cases (the Malcolm Beggs murder, the Waitara 
police shooting and Masterton’s mass murder), and the largely 
behind-the-scene facilitation work they undertook in response to 
community concerns.   
 
One mayor talked of “magic wands”.   Another spoke of both 
positive and negative fall-out: “People do want to think there is 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
somewhere where the buck stops …and we get undeserved 
bouquets as well as brickbats.”     
 
Timaru Mayor Wynne Raymond linked local government 
rationalization – ‘the demise of harbour boards, catchment boards 
and the like’ – to a strengthening community focus on mayors:  
The community has no one else really to turn to who can’t 
put up the excuse of hiding behind the curtain of 
commercial sensitivity.  Because of this mayors must now 
be involved in all sorts of issues and I certainly regard that 
as part of my role. 
 
 
Palmerston North’s Mayor Jill White commented:   
Whatever the word leadership means, there’s a very strong 
sense and expectation of the mayor being a leader - and this 
is not unrealistic - but there’s a difference between power 
and influence. 
   
 
North Shore’s Mayor George Wood:   
The Mayor’s Office is perceived as the place the buck 
stops. I get many calls from people who are wanting the 
mayor to use some mystical powers to solve their 
problems.  Whilst I do try and resolve these issues, as many 
of them have been around for quite sometime, it is also 
important that the mayor does not give false expectation of 
hope.  I have, however, been very surprised in relation to 
the number of issues that the mayor can work through and 
find a satisfactory resolution.  
 
  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
A number of mayors used the term ‘first citizen’ to describe this 
traditional leadership role and the high expectations held by 
citizens. This often resulted in demands for mayors to “do 
everything, be everywhere”, and almost all mayors recorded very 
high community expectations that only the mayor will do - in 
terms of attendance at their events (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 - Community Events
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This illustrates the high leader status communities continue to 
accord the mayor, and their disillusionment with politically 
appointed substitutes.   
 
A clear view emerged that mayors take up the community 
leadership role with gusto, beyond the traditional ceremonial 
figurehead, acting as facilitators and advocates to promote both 
general community well-being and assist individual cases, and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
representing community interests within their councils. The lack of 
statutory legitimacy does not appear to deter them, and inhibitions 
relate to time pressures, inappropriate resources and substitutes, 
profile envy and internal council politics. There is an argument 
that could be made, then, that the recognition of this community 
leadership role in policy would clarify mayors’ leadership 
authority in accordance with public expectations and endorse their 
primary position in local governance and council leadership. 
 
 
SECTION TWO   
The Law 
The second section of this chapter will deal with issues related to 
the law.  Mayors were asked to rank their level of satisfaction with 
the status quo (the current situation of silence in law) and indicate 
their level of support for legislative clarification on a specific 
range of functions.  Mayoral comments in support of legislative 
clarification of the mayor’s role emphasized the goal of effective 
governance and were not simply a call for greater authority in the 
face of council conflict.  Comments indicated a concern to enhance 
the public perception of local government and to promote 
increased awareness and understanding of the mayoral role and its 
responsibilities – and its leadership importance.   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Mayors’ viewpoints on the current situation (the status quo) 
compared with a change to statutory role clarification, were wide-
ranging  (Figure 11). 
  
Figure 11 - Legal Clarification
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Half of the mayors ranked the need for legal clarification of 
mayoral authority very highly, scoring 7-10, and overall 8 was the 
most popular ranking, with the average at 6.2 (on a 0-10 scale of 
importance).  One in four mayors gave this low or lower priority, 
in the range 0-4. Two mayors who scored ‘the status quo’ highly, 
also noted this ranking as support for what they described as “the 
proposals”.   One interpretation is that more respondents may have 
taken the term ‘status quo’ to refer to the June 2001 Review 
Consultation Document proposals (circulating at the same time as 
my questionnaire) rather than to the existing situation as intended. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
However, this possibility has been balanced by the more specific 
scoring on the range of roles, and the higher average rankings in 
support.    
 
Leadership roles      
The mayors were also asked to rank 0-10 their support for 
legislative clarification on 11 specified categories covering policy 
leadership, political leadership and community leadership (Figure 
12).    
 
Figure 12 - Specified Roles
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The overall support was high for all categories, and confirmed the 
mayors’ practices (and views of their roles and responsibilities) as 
outlined in Section One of this chapter.   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The responses indicate the mayors supported the strengthening of 
the political leadership role, with responsibilities for setting the 
council’s political structure and choosing the deputy mayor and 
committee chairpeople, with support averaging a high ranking 7-8.    
 
The most popular overall ranking for any one category was the top 
10 for the mayoral right to appoint the deputy mayor, which 
attracted a 36 per cent response  (the average score in this category 
was 7.42 on the scale of 0-10).  Leadership in Strategic Plan 
development and community leadership were the next highest, also 
averaging high rankings of 7+. Policy leadership responsibilities – 
to include, in order of priority, the Annual Report, the Annual 
Plan, and the District Plan - were favoured with rankings of 6-7.    
 
Individual responses tended to fit into two clusters:  those who 
supported the strengthening of the mayor’s role in political 
leadership, and those who supported strengthening the policy and 
planning leadership.  Even those who gave low ratings to 
legislative clarification often marked one of these two clusters 
highly, confirming their support for the legitimisation of specific 
leader role authority. Relationships with the CEO, relationships 
with council and councillors, the ability to influence the political 
structure, and authority to appoint committee chairpeople and the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
deputy mayor were factors influencing those who sought 
legislative provision related to political leadership.    
 
One mayor’s comment that “the buck stops with me” illustrated 
the high ratings for the mayor’s role and responsibility for the 
Annual Plan and Report, the Strategic Plan and the District Plan.   
 
Other comments indicated the assessments that legal provision 
would legitimise existing mayors’ practice, provide a stronger 
foundation, reduce tensions, and clarify mayoral roles and 
responsibilities (for chief executives and councillors, rather than 
the community).  Legislative provision for the community 
leadership role was strongly supported although some mayors 
commented that this role was “up to the person”.    
 
 
Shadbolt was typical of those with “mixed feelings” but gave high 
rankings for legal clarification. He declared he was: 
… a bit nervous about legal provisions. It may confine us. 
Currently we have very few political shackles.  This is such 
an un-mined area, yet such an important one.  It’s the only 
job that’s never been defined. It’s the only job that hasn’t any 
form of job description. 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Conversely Hall – with 24 years of experience in local government 
– said “it is absolutely unnecessary to define the mayors’ role in 
law”.   
I personally believe that legislative control on the role of 
mayor will be counter productive and create more problems 
than it will solve. 
 
 
Others acknowledged the challenging times but supported the 
status quo, and Francis was typical: “…some significant 
problems/not a major need for change”.  
 
While there was strong consensus on what the mayoral job entails, 
on the whole those mayors who preferred a laissez faire approach 
of freedom from prescription were concerned at any curtailment in 
law.  
 
In contrast Stewart exemplified those strongly in favour of 
statutory role clarity, yet argued the ongoing importance of the 
personal stamp of leadership:   
You have to interpret the mayor’s role for yourself. You do 
it as you see it. 
 
She said mayors establish “their own parameters, listening to 
residents and council”: 
 You may step over the line and they soon let you know.  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Morrison’s view was that there needed to be more “legislative 
security” for the role of the mayor, and that could be through legal 
definition. 
 
Summary 
The pattern to emerge from these responses was that these mayors 
self-defined or self-legitimised the role and functions of their 
office, in response to community expectations as they experienced 
them, and in reflection of the leadership tradition of the mayoralty 
and the purpose of local government.  
 
They confirmed that the mayoral role incorporated functions of 
community and council leadership, as well as executive and policy 
leadership in influencing the political structure of councils and 
policy direction and development. They identified goodwill 
(attitudes and behaviours) from both colleague councillors and 
their CEO as the ‘essence’ for effective governance, and gave 
priority to ‘team-building’ in recognition of this essential 
ingredient.  
 
The time-honoured leader conventions and the traditional respect 
for the office of mayor have waned in strength, can no longer be 
guaranteed (if they ever could be), and the mayors place greater 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
reliance on asserting and earning the leadership role within their 
councils. To reiterate: the mayors’ ability to deliver results 
depended on their team-building skills and not on tradition or 
assumed goodwill towards the office they held.  ‘Bad-will’ (and 
uncivil behaviours), as well as disregard for the leadership 
responsibilities of the mayor - evident in the appointment of 
mayoral opponents as deputy mayors and attempts to undermine 
incumbents in policy and direction-setting – were debilitating 
factors.  The bureaucratic leader (the CEO) is able to exercise 
authority not subjected to the role control mechanisms anticipated 
in the Minister-Official central government model.  Standing 
Orders are a further convention able to be disregarded, and 
although there was support for a legislated Code of Conduct, there 
was also awareness that on its own, this would be merely a guide 
and able to be disobeyed.   
 
The traits (characteristics and skills) of the person may be 
deployed to ‘balance’ the loss of authority (and influence) 
associated with the office of mayor when conventional and 
traditional ‘protection’ is weakened by non-conforming collegial 
behaviours. In other words, the person becomes more important 
than the position.  But as both Rodney and Rangitikei illustrate, 
dependence on the personality or charisma of the mayor – without 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
the safeguards of legitimised role authority - brings the risk of 
disharmony, ineffective governance and dysfunctionality as a 
consequence.  Mayors acknowledged this in their call for role 
clarity in law.  
 
If – as Magill (1995) suggests – it is accepted that the mayor has 
civil legitimacy by reason of the electoral mandate, yet in practice 
mayoral authority and power is dependent on council colleagues, 
there is a sound democratic case for mayoral role clarification. 
This is particularly so in the current climate, in response to the 
impact of discord both on local governance and community 
expectations, and in the event that effective governance is the 
desired outcome.  
 
There was strong mayoral support for the definition of specific 
leadership functions in law. As with local government CEOs, 
statutory provision in itself will merely replace the traditional 
foundation based on convention with one in law.  Even with 
improved accountability mechanisms - for councillors, CEOs, and 
mayors, and including a legislated Code of Conduct - the person 
who occupies the mayoral seat will continue to bring influence to 
the position and the situation. This is as it should be, with the 
democratic process of elections combined with legislated 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
requirements for openness and transparency providing the 
framework for mayoral choice, scrutiny and accountability.  The 
local leadership role incorporates functions, process, style and 
‘personality’.  
  
It is my thesis that once a community elects their mayor that person 
would be in a better position to execute the leadership functions 
expected from the office with a job description written into law. 
The nature of the 1989 provision for CEOs - together with its 1988 
State Sector origins confirming the importance of the 
administrative-political relationship - provides a statutory 
precedent. With the interwoven nature of the person-position-
situation, tradition and convention now no longer provide adequate 
protection for either the community or for the mayoral incumbent 
contracted to lead. 
 
 
I next refer to leadership literature, before outlining my 
conclusions in the final chapter. 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1. This council now has a new CEO. 
 
2. The term ‘lame duck’ has emerged through media usage, and is applied 
to the powerless mayor, and less commonly to the passionless. A number of 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
mayors used the term in their responses, including its application to mayors who 
had declared their intention to retire at the term end.  In my experience, the 
expression was used by councillors who wished to confine the authority and role 
of the mayor in order to transfer the leadership function to the council, or to 
their group. 
 
3. A new remuneration system has been introduced in 2003, and may 
result in reduced tensions in this area (although in Hamilton, chairpeople will 
continue to be paid some $10,000/a more than their non-chair colleagues). My 
own experience is that the creation of additional chair roles has been widely 
used as a mechanism for political patronage, and is recognized within the local 
government sector as such. Moreover, the meeting payments’ based system has 
led to meeting overdose to ensure committee members ‘earn’ more pay. I was a 
member of the LGNZ council working party on this issue. 
 
4. In a publicised Hamilton City Council case (Waikato Times, April 24, 
2003), the dropping of the mayor’s column from City News (a council-
published newspaper) illustrates this issue, the authority tensions that can arise 
between the mayor and the bureaucracy  (in this case the council’s 
Communication & Marketing General Manager), and the potential for staff 
and/or council control of the mayoral ‘mouthpiece’. The GM edited out a 
section of the mayor’s self-prepared column; the mayor did not agree with the 
change, and the column was dropped.  In an email, the GM suggests a 
‘fundamental difference’ in the way the mayor viewed the mayor’s column to 
the way the council saw it. The GM also suggested the only way to formally test 
his understanding was to ‘put the matter before Council’ (21 March, 2003).  The 
council majority is publicly opposed to the mayor.  This case also illustrates the 
ability of the bureaucracy to ‘silence’ the mayor (as outlined by mayoral 
responses in my survey). On the other hand, the potential for others to author 
statements bearing the mayor’s signature - to ‘put words into the mayor’s 
mouth’ – is also in conflict with the principles of openness and transparency as 
well as the concept of democratic leadership, and illustrates the powerlessness 
of the mayoral position when faced with internal opposition. 
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
MAYORS, SCHOLARS, AND HISTORY 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the foundations of the mayoral office and 
the leader traditions and conventions upon which it is based.  I then 
explore the functions of leadership as they relate to local 
governance, focusing on authority for leadership, the execution of 
that authority and obstacles encountered.  My contention is that 
mayors are elected to execute leadership for their communities and 
their councils, and my search is for obstacles to that, especially 
those caused by the legally undefined mayoral role. 
  
Mayoral leadership remains largely unexplored by researchers. A 
common factor in much of the leadership literature – spanning 
almost 3000 years – is the recognition of conflict as the companion 
of leaders and leadership, and the concept that leadership involves a 
relationship requiring followers. The birth of the chief executive 
officer (CEO) in the 19th century during the development of 
industrialisation, introduced the concept of industry leader, and led 
to the contemporary debate on leadership functions and role clarity.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
During the late 20th century, in response to concerns about the 
quality of leadership, mediocrity and irresponsibility, the 
identification of leadership potential, as well as leadership 
guidance, has been of significant interest to scholars. This is 
encapsulated by Conger’s (2002) ‘lessons about the right stuff’ 
(Jackson and Parry, 2002, p 12), and the recognition of ‘integrity’ 
as a leader quality (p 211).   
 
Leadership and Leadership Studies 
Through the 1980s there was an explosion of literature about 
leadership, particularly in the business sector.  A new emphasis was 
placed on working towards established goals and objectives to 
achieve excellence in outcomes, particularly in terms of profits.  
This coincided with major economic and structural changes 
globally, and the 1987 stock market crash with resultant cynicism 
and disillusionment towards business leaders.  In New Zealand it 
was marked by the 1984 launch of a significant period of public 
sector change – corporatisation, privatisation, and the influence of 
business models for governance.  This was the lead-up to the 1988 
State Sector Act, and the 1989 local government reforms that set 
the scene and operating environment for the following decade (as 
previously discussed). 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
A number of 1990s authors note the resurgence of interest in and 
search for the definite ‘holy grail of leadership’13 – that is, a greater 
understanding of what leadership ‘is’. The result has been a 
multiplicity of models and theories (Mileham & Spacie, 1996, p 3).  
Definitions relating to leaders and leading, divide the concept of 
leadership (as a noun) into functional or positional categories 
(referring to a primary, ‘chief’, or first place) and to personal 
abilities (traits, characteristics).  This is applicable to mayors – in 
terms of the official position (the office) and personal qualities (the 
person).  As a verb, ‘to lead’ or ‘leading’ brings a multitude of 
connotations and nuance of style ranging from the forceful, to the 
taking charge - directing or commanding, to the influencing - 
guiding, and from the front as well as from within and by example 
(evidenced by dictionary definitions e.g. Concise Oxford Dictionary 
and Heinemann New Zealand Dictionary (1979)).  
 
Mayors gain the positional status of headship with the office; they 
are ‘primary, in first place, the chief’.  The office brings with it the 
function ‘to lead’.  In this research, the concern it with the 
execution of leadership by the mayor and the barriers encountered, 
whatever the mayor’s personal style and process for leading.    
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The Office of Mayor in New Zealand is based on a long tradition of 
leader status in human settlements.  The mayoral title is derived 
from the post classical Latin ‘major’ (more great) and ‘magnus’ 
(maximum), and the application as ‘majores palatii’ and ‘major 
domo’  - palace dignitaries from the early 6th century AD. London’s 
mayoralty dates back 800 years, New York’s 350 years. Whether 
appointed by monarchs, governments, or ‘free men’, mayors were 
invested with judicial authority and decision-making powers. They 
were given significant status as local ‘rulers’, civil magistrates 
administering laws and justice at the local level in their cities and 
towns.  
 
Self-governing City States, political leadership and conflict at the 
local level provided the foundation for the earliest leadership 
studies some 2,500 years ago (e.g. the Greek City States and The 
Republic – Plato (428-347BC)14, and the Chinese warlords in The 
Art of War – Sun Zhu (400-320BC)).  The tumult of Europe’s 15th 
century City States further influenced classical leadership 
philosophy (e.g. The Prince - Machiavelli (1469-1527)). The 
demise of traditional and aristocratic leader systems of governance 
during the 19th and early 20th century led to the trend towards 
‘influence and process’ in leadership studies, away from leadership 
definitions emphasising centralization of power and control in 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
reflection of the earlier ‘lordship’ tradition (Rost, 1991, p 47).  
 
In the following section I introduce themes from the leadership 
literature touching on trait, behavioural, and situational leadership 
theories - before developing some categorisations relating to 
leadership and authority.   
   
Trait Studies 
The focus on trait studies was influenced by the great man-great 
woman theory (based on people endowed with extraordinary or 
God-given heroic qualities). The concern in this field was to 
identify one trait that best differentiated leaders from non-leaders to 
measure leadership potential, and commonly to assist recruitment 
and development in the workplace (Borgatt and Montgomery, 2000, 
p 1565).  Stogdill’s (1948) early research listed a set of leadership 
personality and behavioural characteristics of effective leaders, 
including sociability, initiative, persistence, knowing how to get 
things done, self-confidence, alertness to and insight into situations, 
co-operativeness, popularity, adaptability, verbal facility (Bass, 
1990, p 75). Fifty years later, Hogan and colleagues (1994) 
introduced a multi-trait approach known as the ‘big five’ for 
predicting effective leaders – extroversion, emotional stability, 
openness, intellect, and surgency (Borgatt and Montgomery, ibid).  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Although these are ‘predictive’ mechanisms for employers, they 
can be applied to political leadership and mayors.     
 
Mileham and Spacie (1996) - forecasting a future in which 
leadership will become “more necessary”, leading “more difficult 
and certainly more demanding” (p 189) - list 36 qualities, and quote 
“personal integrity” as the one most frequently appearing on 
‘desirable attributes’ lists for leaders. They link this to the 
contemporary environment of “well-publicized incidents in both 
public and private sectors” (p 23) – a reference to political and 
financial scandals and their impact on community expectations.  
These authors typically define leadership “at its most fundamental” 
as about people and about influencing others and giving them 
direction.  Implicit is the idea of identifying the way ahead, and a 
following by others – apt when applied to the mayoral role in 
principle, and reflecting historical notions.   
  
Laquian, Ravinet, Bergen and Rabinovitch’s (1996) international 
snapshot of ‘useful’ mayoral leadership characteristics (traits and 
behaviours) includes a strong political will, the ability to plan and 
prioritise, communication and facilitation skills (The Urban Age, 
1996, pp1-5) 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Behavioural Studies 
Leadership behaviour research focused on examining the differing 
effects of democratic, autocratic and laissez-faire leadership styles 
and has identified the categories of the ‘considerate’ leader (people-
oriented or socio-emotional), and the ‘structure’ leader (task-
focused or production-oriented) (DuBrin, 1995, p 79).  In the late 
70’s this field moved on to ‘transformational’ leadership (visionary, 
empowering, and human relationships flavoured) and task-focused 
‘transactional’ leadership behaviours (e.g. McGregor Burns (1978) 
and Bass (1985)). These behaviours (or styles) can be compared 
with Kotter and Lawrence’s (1974) United States’ mayoral leader 
types - ceremonial, caretaker, personality/individualist, executive, 
and programme entrepreneur, as well as John and Cole’s (1999) 
British mayor models - caretaker, consensual facilitator, city boss, 
and visionary (Sweeting, 2002, pp 6-7). 
 
The development of effective leadership behaviours and training for 
people in leader positions was the core of 1980-90’s leadership 
studies on empowerment, coaching and facilitating (e.g. Kouzes 
and Posner (1987)). Rahim (1985) and Thomas (1992) identified 
five conflict management styles (competitive, withdrawing, 
accommodating, compromising, and collaborating) that reflected 
behaviourist studies and confirmed the influence of collegial 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
relationships and conflict. 
 
Situational Theory 
Situational theorists today conclude that regardless of the leader’s 
values, traits, or other characteristics, situational factors influence 
both the emergence and behaviours of the leader. Situational factors 
stem from the environment (or climate) in which the leader 
functions and its constitutional framework, and include the 
interaction of people and place as well as ‘the spirit of the times’ 
(the macro-situational factor as in Marx’s early 20th century 
zeitgeist approach). Three particular dimensions of the environment 
in which the mayor (and mayoral office) functions are: the internal 
council dynamics, the local community, and the ‘Big Picture’ 
(nationally and globally).  
 
A major influence is perception of the leader (what others think of 
the leader), and that perception can be contaminated by others’ 
aspirations (Borgatt and Montgomery, p 1564-1565). For mayors, 
situational contaminants include collegial attitudes and behaviours 
towards the mayor and the mayoral role, and the failure to give 
accord to traditional mayoral authority. Community perceptions of 
mayors can be contaminated both by expectations of mayoral 
authority based on tradition and convention rather than today’s 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
reality, as well as by contemporary disillusionment with leadership 
and leaders.    
 
Scholars such as Bass (1953) examined the physical environment – 
seating arrangement, or distances between individuals – as well as 
communication patterns and access to information. Borgatt and 
Montgomery point to visibility and control of information as among 
the necessary situational factors to assist leader recognition (p 
1567), elements that have been confirmed in my research e.g. the 
mayoral functions of council spokesperson, mayoral reporting, and 
community event attendance, as well as media relationships. 
Beyond this micro influence, the zeitgeist impact includes macro 
factors: the ‘Big Picture’ of the international sustainability agenda, 
national (as well as community) attitudes towards and expectations 
of local leadership, and the media, as I have already outlined.  
Leaders interact with the world around them (Sweeting, 2002, p 6).     
 
Authority and Leadership 
Ability to lead is influenced by the situation – especially the 
authority given to the position of the leader.  Kouzes and Posner 
(1995, pp 23-26) noted this in their study of changing expectations 
of leadership, which identified that ‘all’ people recognized “the 
authority that comes with position” (p 186), and that the presence 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
and impact of opposition related to “the very nature of the role [of 
leadership]” (p 27). 
         
Defining leadership as “the art of mobilizing others to want to 
struggle for shared aspirations” (p 30) –described as a metaphorical 
journey – these authors’ emphasis is on the ‘dynamics of the 
relationship’ as essential to understanding leadership, and the 
“fundamental human aspirations that connect leaders to 
constituents”. These authors describe strategies, tactics, skills and 
practices as “empty” unless this is understood (p 19).  For mayors, 
the emptiness includes the absence of rational-legal authority and 
its link with relationship dynamics within councils and the human 
aspirations found there.     
 
Weber’s early 20th century work on authority has particular 
relevance here. He divided power into two basic types of influence 
- ability and authority - and argued that leadership was based on 
three foundations of legitimate authority - traditionalism, charisma, 
and rational-legal authority. These were ‘pure’ types rarely found in 
reality, with “highly complex variants, transitions, and 
combinations”. Nevertheless they provide a framework for 
classifying leadership situations (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1948, p 
78).  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The notion of leadership based on traditional authority reflects 
Elwood’s assumptions of the sources of mayoral legitimacy, as 
outlined earlier, and brings together the office with the office-
holder – position with person – in a situation with ideally expected 
behaviours.  Today it does not guarantee mayoral leader authority. 
 
Weber defines charisma as “the authority of the extraordinary and 
personal gift of grace (charisma)…or other qualities of individual 
leadership” (Gerth and Wright Mills, p 79).  To Weber, charismatic 
authority is based only on the ‘call’, the charismatic qualification 
recognised by followers, and outside the concepts of election 
appointment and dismissal, career or promotion. The leader’s 
judgments need have no association with rules, legal principles and 
precedents. Weber also suggests that charismatic authority will 
disappear in the event the leader is for long unsuccessful, and above 
all if the leadership fails to benefit followers.   
 
It is my contention that both the traditional and charismatic 
foundations for mayoral authority are strongly rooted within the 
community. Legitimate mayoral authority in today’s circumstance, 
therefore, depends on tradition and charisma, not rational-legal 
authority. But while mayoral legitimacy may be widely accepted in 
the local community (being able to be traced through re-election 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
and opinion surveys), it may not be present within the council, not 
because the mayor lacks ability (personal), but because of council 
politics. This accords with Weber’s view that authority obedience is 
determined by “highly robust motives of fear and hope” and by 
“interests of the most varied sort” – including hope for reward 
(Gerth and Wright Mills, p 79).  The community basis of mayoral 
leadership may be undermined from within City Hall, and is 
dependent on the mayor’s ability to craft an internal ‘corporate 
group’ willing to hear the ‘call’ of charismatic authority. There is 
therefore potential for instability and the inhibiting of effective 
governance, in conflict with community expectations of mayoral 
leadership.   
 
Weber’s concept of rational-legal authority is largely based on the 
modern state and bureaucratic organisations (Wrong, p 50), and 
defined as “domination by virtue of legality, by virtue of the belief 
in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based on 
rationally created rules”  (Gerth and Wright Mills, p 79).  
Obedience, or compliance, is expected in discharging statutory 
obligations, and the domination is “as exercised by the modern 
servant of the state and by all those bearers of power who in this 
respect resemble him” (ibid).   This type of authority reflects the 
current statutory provisions for local government CEOs, and to 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
some extent the council, but not the office of the mayor.  CEO 
legality sits in a situation of behavioural expectations, ideally, not 
guaranteed; but in today’s challenging climate this is a solid 
foundation compared with mayoral authority based on eroding 
tradition. 
 
Brosnahan (1999), speaking from a New Zealand local government 
practitioner’s perspective, acknowledges the ‘situation’ in which 
the leader is functioning as an essential success factor, and calls for 
clear definition of responsibility (p 11). She also notes that “well 
led organizations appear to be better able to weather change and 
adversity, to achieve real outcomes’’ (Brosnahan, 1999, p 2). 
 
Benefits of Emphasising Rational-Legal Authority 
Emphasising the rational-legal sources of political authority 
provides a means of limiting mayoral domination and the rise of 
‘omnivorous’ mayors. Bernhard’s (1998) argument is that 
“charismatic leadership is only compatible with democracy when 
charisma is routinised in a rational-legal direction”, and that 
rational-legal procedures (the rule-boundedness of power) must 
predominate over charismatic elements (the arbitrary and personal 
exercise of power) to avoid dictatorship (Bernhard, 1998, p 1). This 
signals the value in statutory clarity of role and functions, and his 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
comments are applicable to New Zealand and local government, 
particularly in terms of the low election turnouts, the opportunities 
for charismatic personalities to arise, and the absence of rational-
legal provisions (and constraints) for the office of mayor. 
 
The harnessing of bureaucratic power for the greater good and 
against self-service, at a time of great change and great challenge, 
suggests to me that a rational-legal approach to the role of the 
mayor in tandem with the provisions for CEOs, could provide a 
stable everyday authority foundation for leadership to ‘rise to the 
occasion’. This would be subjected to ongoing challenge, but a 
combination of protections based in law, including an enforceable 
council Code of Conduct and effective tutelage and scrutiny 
provisions, would be a deterrent to self-serving or mischievous 
mayoral opposition, and to mayoral authoritarianism.   
 
Moore (1996) links leadership positions to the requirement to 
shoulder responsibility and then to create a campaign to achieve 
authority, reinforcing the duet of position-specific and personal 
authority.  With reference to the political (rather than business) 
environment he notes that such leadership positions did not “offer 
up authority on the scale required, whether working to restore your 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
neighbourhood or trying to reverse the fortunes of the United 
Nations” (Moore, 1996, p 267). 
 
Clarke (May 19973), in reflecting on his New Zealand local 
government study, refers specifically to the issue of mayoral 
leadership.  He comments that they have “no executive authority”, 
using personal style and process to execute their leader functions, in 
a manner that mirrors the admissions of mayors in my study 
(Clarke, May 1997, p 7):   
While not true of all, most accrue significant influence and 
moral authority.  They work alongside their fellow 
councillors, building coalitions and alliances to secure support 
for particular initiatives. They are an important local voice, 
and advocate and work at building extensive networks of 
contact and influence.  The best will be deeply involved in 
most facets of community life. Many are formidable players.  
They are in a position of prominence and attract much 
publicity.  They perform important civic and social roles and 
are seen as the ‘personification of the locality’. 
 
  
Like Elwood (2001) and Brosnahan (1999), Clarke’s approach to 
the issue of mayoral authority in New Zealand is that it is a 
consequence of a journey in which influence is accrued, and 
personal traits and behaviours provide mechanisms for influence 
rather than the authority that stems from the traditional surrounding 
the role. Elwood talks of status ‘earned’ through behaviour ‘in 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
leading, persuading, and guiding’, and distinct from power 
(Elwood, 2001, p 1). 
   
Grint (1997) defines authority as power derived from the formal 
role, while leadership is the power derived from the informal role.  
The association of authority with formal roles concurs with the 
contention that the Office of Mayor is one of leader authority, and 
that its powers need to be clarified and legitimised. Clark’s 
assumption that authority (and influence) is ‘accrued’, together with 
Elwood’s ‘earned’, is not matched by community expectations of 
the office - and its role.  Quoting Kutner (1950), Grint says leaders 
“need authority”, but implies the requirement for giving as well as 
taking, since there is no mandate for any leader to employ authority 
without the eventual approval of “the group” - “To remain truly 
democratic, the demos must also be the watchdog of its own 
leadership” (Grint, 1997, pp 158-165).  This is consistent with the 
argument of Rost (1991) who maintains that people in authority 
positions (mayors along with presidents, governors and CEOs) are 
not automatically leaders by virtue of their holding that position of 
authority (p 123), and can be ‘kept from’ leadership by ‘naked 
power’ and ‘conflict’ (pp 114-121).  Leadership to him is “an 
influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real 
changes that reflect their mutual purposes” (p 150).  This confirms 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
the elements of two-way relationships within a climate of integrity 
in the journey towards individual and collective leadership – the 
situation influence.   
 
As Weber argues the situational influence prompting charismatic 
leadership to arise, Rost presents the mirror image: the situation 
preventing leadership, and in a manner applicable to local 
government where power stalks undressed. He insists the post 
industrial paradigm calls for leaders and followers to understand 
that the common good of the community or society must be put 
ahead of individual, group, or organisational ‘good’ (pp 174-175). 
 
Grint advocates for “persons, processes, and contexts” (p 314). His 
argument is that leadership needs to be seen within “the structure of 
leader-situation interaction” and the dynamics of the leadership 
process (p 126).   
 
Similar to Grint, Mileham and Spacie’s (1996) definition of 
authority refers to that which is ‘invested’ (in the individual) and 
‘that which has to be earned’ (Mileham and Spacie, 1996, p 140). 
The latter they term the main source of authority of the effective 
leader and “potentially the most potent”, as well as the least 
tangible. My focus however is the former, the invested authority, 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
which can be interpreted as accompanying the job description, the 
authority placed with a person because of the position occupied.  
 
These authors refer to recent research that suggests the single 
greatest cause of stress within many organisations and teams is 
unclear roles: the blurring or misunderstanding of tasks, what is 
expected, and what the bounds of their own and other’s 
responsibilities are, where authority lies – “and surprisingly there is 
a failure to acknowledge this”. Their advice: 
If there is any room for doubt, seek clarification (ibid).  
 
That is a core issue in my thesis: clarification of the authority of the 
mayor, to determine what leader authority is vested in the office 
and to remove doubt from the collegial situation, while recognizing 
that accrual of influence may come from the journey of experience.   
 
Mileham and Spacie also link authority with accountability, 
referring to the trend towards making leaders and leadership teams 
“legally as well as morally liable” for their discussions and actions, 
and they forecast enforced Codes of Ethics (ibid).  As with Grint, 
their definitions of authority reflect Weber’s ideal models of 
rational-legal (invested), and a traditional-charismatic combination 
(earned), and their cynicism at the assumption of collective 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
integrity admits an environment of less-than loyal ‘followers’ and 
even the lack of individual integrity – Weber’s ideal climate for 
‘revolution’.  
 
And organisational politics are played to achieve power, either 
directly or indirectly:  
A leader must have power, the potential or ability to influence 
decisions and control resources (DuBrin, 1995, p 142). 
   
 
Earlier, in 1990 before London’s mayoralty was re-established, 
Svara defined city leadership to include “the initiation of proposals 
to deal with problems in the community and the implementation of 
policy through control of the bureaucracy” (Svara, 1990, p 81).  His 
view was that although the mayoral position was one of “great 
visibility”, its variety of “governmental forms” were “more or less 
insufficient” or “non existent”, and he concluded that leadership is: 
A challenge for the strong mayor, difficult for the weak 
mayor, and impossible for the council-manager mayor (ibid). 
 
 
  
Sweeting (2002) - referring to Svara’s work - describes two types of 
mayoral power: ‘power over’ (using formal powers and the 
resources of their office to achieve goals) and ‘power to’ (creating a 
vision and ‘facilitatively’ encouraging engagement, co-operation 
and commitment) (Sweeting, 2002, p 7).  Using the Mayor of 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
London as his example, Sweeting concludes that even with a 
‘strong mayor’ foundation, the facilitation of co-operation from 
others is necessary “in order to wield power to act” and for 
effective governance (p 18). Put the other way, ‘power over’ is 
insufficient on its own, yet ‘power to’ emerges from its legitimised 
authority. 
  
Summary 
In summary, the office of the mayor is an ancient post, a high office 
of dignity and significance.  Mayors gain headship with the office. 
Their positional status is first, and their function is to lead their 
territories and their citizens as well as the governance units 
established to support their administration.  Leading is about 
influencing, from the front as well as from within.  It is about 
ability and authority.   
 
Today, in the absence of legislative clarity, it is the council (or even 
the chief executive) who may decide on the authority of the mayor 
to lead the administration, influenced by the individual leader’s 
personal style, relationships with the bureaucracy and the chief 
executive, and councillors’ personal and political agendas.  This is 
the situational influence, and it can be anti-democratic when 
measured against the expectations of the electorate.  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
However, as Weber and contemporary leadership theorists 
illustrate, authority is not and cannot be set in concrete.  Even if a 
council strips a mayor of internal authority, that same mayor can 
hold and execute authority in the eyes of the public.  And the 
instability associated with chief executive’s positions during the 
1990s confirms the impact of personal and situational forces, even 
when there is a rational-legal foundation to the position.       
 
Yet, while some await the Messiah’s arrival, and mourn the loss of 
tradition, evidence (and experience) suggests that a job description 
for mayors in the rational-legal sense, acknowledging their 
intertwined roles of community and council leadership, would 
complement more clearly the existing statutory reference to chief 
executives and reinforce what most authors refer to as authority.  
This positional clarity would provide the foundation for the 
person/situation blend enabling the leader to arise in response to the 
climate and issues of the time, in contrast with the current situation 
with its reliance on personal style (and characteristics).   
 
Moore’s ecosystem style for the future suggests legislative clarity 
requires integration with associated behavioural control 
mechanisms.  Enforceable Codes of Conduct are a rough instrument 
although, building on the culture of Standing Orders, they could be 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
effective restraints in all but the most unruly power-filled situations 
to encourage the rise of ethical behaviour and integrity rather than 
anarchy and conflict. Restoration of a positive leadership culture 
within local government may well lead to an increase in public 
confidence. 
 
My contention is that while the Local Government Act (2002) 
addresses ‘our common future’ by proposing sustainable 
development as a new purpose for local government, the ongoing 
failure to acknowledge the evolving breadth of responsibility 
associated with the office of mayor denies the identified linkage 
between local leadership and delivery on this agenda.  Statutory 
clarification of the mayoral role as council and community leader 
with the function to lead, would provide an authority-accountability 
mechanism to address both the internal council and the external 
community dynamics associated with each place and time.  
Democratic election processes are already in place to address the 
person.  My leader focus illuminates the job responsibility 
(function) to lead, to enable incumbents from the beginning (ability 
and authority), and to enhance their opportunities for leadership 
(outcome).    
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The office of mayor will continue, and there are strong indications 
even more leadership will be expected of that position – and the 
individual incumbents – in the future. A combination of legitimised 
mayoral authority with provision for direct CEO interface is low 
risk in comparison with ongoing reliance on tradition.  
 
To conclude this section, and emphasise the thrust towards a new 
style of leadership for the future, I again refer to Moore’s (1996) 
endless ecosystem cycle.  This is reminiscent of Weber’s theory of 
domination and the instability of charismatic leadership, crafted 
almost a century ago.  As discussed earlier in this thesis, to Weber 
the charismatic leader had a God-given element, but the arising of 
such leaders and their ability to deliver was dependent on the 
dynamics of the ecosystem, subjected them to a complex set of 
personal, positional and situational pressures on their authority.  
Weber’s concept of balance linking personal charismatic qualities 
(stemming either from the inner person or brought out by the 
situation) with rational-legal authority, to temper the anti-
democratic autocracy of bureaucracy, sets out a relevant agenda for 
the 21st century that is applicable to the role and responsibilities of 
the mayor in the New Zealand local government situation.  In 
addition, the same rational-legal recipe, in times of change and 
challenge, allows an individual with a calling for politics (perhaps 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
even charismatic leadership potential), to arise and be enabled to 
exercise the political and community leader function, also providing 
partnership and balance with the rational-legal administrative 
leadership function defined for the chief executive. 
 
Today the descriptions ‘strong mayor’ and ‘weak mayor’ are used 
to describe the institutional structures on which the office is based 
in terms of their formal relationship with the council (Sweetman, 
2002, p 7).  London and New York are ‘strong mayor’ examples, 
involving directly elected mayors with decision-making powers.  
These mayors have formal authority to control policy and budgets, 
and to appoint staff, while the councils have the function of 
scrutinizing the mayors’ actions – similar to the Parliamentary 
system of government and opposition.  New Zealand mayors fit the 
‘weak mayor’ model, sharing governance and control with other 
elected mayors in their councils, and with no body or group given 
formal scrutiny functions, leaving that to the electorate and 
elections.  The New Zealand system relies on community 
participation, and requirements of openness and transparency to 
keep the council honest, rather than the mayor specifically, 
although in practice it is the mayor to whom the community gives 
the primary leadership function (and responsibility).  The emphasis 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
in law is on the governance relationship between the governors and 
the CEO, and this is termed the council/manager system. 
 
In New Zealand cities and districts, the public evidences their 
mayor through media profile, and in person, commonly adorned 
with the ceremonial robes and chains of office, acting as the 
primary community leader at a wide variety of community events 
and exhibiting traditional mayoral authority.  Public attendance at 
council meetings is rare, but the combination of the open door 
policy allowing ready access to mayors, and media reporting of 
council business, further presents the nation’s mayors to their 
communities as governing leaders, in a manner reflective of the 
ancient judicial role.            
 
I present my conclusion in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1. The reference ‘Holy Grail’ stems from the vessel used by Jesus Christ at 
the last supper with his disciples (The Bible: Matthew 26-26, Mark 14-22, 
Luke 22-14).  Its metaphorical use today relates to the continuing search 
for its existence, and the debate on whether it is fact or myth.   
 
2. Pericles was the leader of the Democratic Party when elected ‘Strategos’ 
(military leader) of Athens in 461BC, in victory over the Aristocratic 
Party, at a time marked by war. The ‘Age of Pericles’ produced the 
Parthenon (using public funds and to provide employment for poorer 
citizens), and Athens then was recognised as the most magnificent city of 
the ancient world - a great centre of literature and art. Pericles sought to 
enable all citizens to take an active part in city government, and he 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
introduced payment of citizens for their services to the state.  However, 
the Peloponnesian War (431BC) and plague in overcrowded Athens 
resulted in Pericles being deposed from office, tried and fined for misuse 
of public funds, and then reinstated (before dying of the plague himself) 
(Encarta.com).  Pericles could be described as Athens’ ‘mayor’ in today’s 
language.  Waitakere Mayor Bob Harvey – in reference to visionary 
leadership - described Pericles as one of his favourite mayors, and 
possibly one of the world’s greatest leaders (Report to Council, 29 
September, 1999).     
 
3. Professor Clarke noted in the foreword that he had met about 25percent 
of New Zealand’s mayors, half the country’s chief executives and a large 
number of councillors and local government managers. He also met the 
then Minister for Local Government Christine Fletcher and Labour Party 
Leader Helen Clark.  He describes Christchurch’s then mayor Vicki Buck 
and Manukau’s Sir Barry Curtis as “dominant” persons.  I attended the 
University of Auckland conference where Professor Clarke was among 
the speakers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research project was to review the 
contemporary role of the mayor in New Zealand and consider 
whether clarification in law of the functions of the mayoral office 
would enable mayors to provide more effective leadership and 
enhance local governance. The concept of role clarification had 
arisen during the 1990s, and there was expectation the 2001-2002 
legislative reforms would include statutory role provision.    
 
I have underlined my research motivation, based on my personal 
experience as a mayor and increasing concerns at the impact of 
discord and conflict. As Stigley (1997) said – in response to the 
Rangitikei situation - good governance is underpinned by goodwill.      
 
My research included a review of the rationale for legislative role 
clarity – expressed by McKinlay (1998) as ‘unfinished business’, 
and by LGNZ a year earlier as ‘a failure to provide adequate 
guidance’ to both the political and management wings.  My review 
took into account Elwood’s 1989 local government reform position 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
- which anticipated the mayoral office would be sustained by 
tradition and convention. I also considered the 2001 reform process, 
and the conclusive deletion of the role clarification issue on the 
grounds it was ‘generally not possible’ to legislate for good 
governance practice – as outlined in Cabinet papers of the time. 
 
The absence of policy specificity relating to the Office of Mayor 
leaves the concept of mayoral authority based on tradition open to 
interpretation.   My research framework – reflecting the call for 
functional clarification – included a review of practitioner 
experience, and the crafting of a generic job description. 
    
I concluded, following a review of leadership literature, that a 
combination of rational-legal protections for the role of the mayor, 
including an enforceable Code of Conduct and effective tutelage 
and scrutiny provisions, would be a deterrent to self-serving or 
mischievous mayoral opposition, and to mayoral authoritarianism. 
A sound basis in law, in tandem with the provisions for CEOs, 
could provide a stable everyday authority foundation for leadership 
to ‘rise to the occasion’, enabling effective governance. 
 
My historic portrait of New Zealand’s mayoral Class of 1989-2001 
presents a diverse group of individuals - New Zealand’s first 21st 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
century mayors - facing the pressures of community expectations 
and political challenges and committing extraordinary hours to their 
efforts to lead and fulfill the assumed governance and leadership 
functions of their office. Their descriptions of the role of the mayor, 
the obstacles they encountered, and their support for a statutory-
based job description, reinforced my functional definition of the 
Office of Mayor in New Zealand and my contended application of 
this in law.  
 
In the absence of policy specificity, these mayors self-defined the 
leader role and functions. They identified council goodwill towards 
them (personal and positional) as the essence of effectiveness (for 
their leadership and council governance), and they relied on their 
team-building skills to achieve this, rather than tradition. In 
particular they acknowledged the importance of the mayor/CEO 
interface.   
 
The Situation 
The mayor – both person and position – has civil legitimacy 
through election, but the leadership authority associated with the 
office remains only notionally legitimate through tradition and 
convention, and is dependent on the complex set of circumstances 
in situ at the time and particularly on the internal council dynamics. 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Others’ aspirations and behaviours may undermine mayors’ 
notional authority within their councils and prevent them from 
leading.  This is the person/position/situation interaction 
influencing the execution of the function to lead, as borne out in 
situational theory developed by leadership scholars.  
 
The tradition and convention associated with the leadership position 
of the mayor, within the contemporary council environment of 
primus inter pares, is fragile and at risk of obstruction and denial in 
the council leaders’ tug of war – as mayors follow the 
Salter/Doogan ‘free agent’ model but councillors ‘rule’ through 
strength of numbers.  The council environment is permeated with 
councillors’ expectations of their own function to lead (as well as 
the mayor’s). Bad-will may predominate over goodwill, and the 
consequence can be disharmony and dysfunctionalism – as Rodney 
illustrated – rather than effective governance focused on 
community good and the pursuit of the purposes of local 
government.   
 
In Rodney, the leader was kept from leading when the balance was 
upset between arbitrary and personal exercise of power and 
rational-legal procedures (the rule-boundedness of power) - 
reflecting Barnard’s (1998) theory.             
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The inevitability of tensions and conflict was recognized in the 
2001-2002 Local Government Act review. ‘Herding cats’, ‘massed 
cockfights’, and ‘bloody struggles’ are metaphors for real situations 
at City Halls, rather than the atmosphere of expected leader 
behaviours embodied in Gastil’s (1993) model - ideally civilised 
and civilising.  Codes of Conduct and Standing Orders – as 
traditional behaviour-guidance mechanisms  - are dependent on 
goodwill for effectiveness while mayoral authority is challengeable.    
 
My leader focus is on the job responsibility (function) to lead, to 
enable incumbents from the beginning (ability and authority), and 
to enhance their opportunities for leadership (outcome).  While my 
promulgation of statutory leader authority is in itself an ideal 
concept, prone still to bad-will and disobedience as is any law, my 
argument is that legislative legitimisation will have two real 
outcomes:   
 Public acknowledgement of the mayors’ dual council-
community leadership roles, and  
 A strengthening of the governance equation between the 
political and administrative by placing the mayor at the peak of the 
political wing of the council to balance the CEO at the peak of the 
bureaucratic division.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
Community expectations are that the buck stops with the mayor, not 
with the CEO, nor councillors.  There is an undercurrent reflecting 
Svara’s 1990 city leadership definition, and Weber’s century-old 
concerns – the need for bureaucratic control to be countered by 
political power (and authority?).          
 
The political leadership role, combined with policy leadership 
responsibilities, ideally involves authority, functions, and 
accountabilities.  Statutory crafting of this model would clarify the 
mayoral role independently of other elected members, confirming 
the primary leadership role and responsibilities authority within the 
primus inter pares political relationship, and providing an 
accountability framework for all – mayor, CEO, councillors, and 
community.  This would finish McKinlay’s ‘business’ and answer 
Stigley’s call for ‘guidance’.           
 
As Weber and later theorists illustrate, authority is not and cannot 
be set in concrete.  The instability associated with CEOs’ positions 
during the 1990s (both within New Zealand local government and 
internationally) confirms the impact of personal and situational 
forces, even when there is a rational-legal foundation to the 
position.  However, a statutory focus on mayors’ roles and 
responsibilities may well lead to the restoration of a positive 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
leadership culture and an increase in public confidence, simply 
because the authority and functions would be clarified openly and 
publicly.  
 
This legitimisation would ensure mayoral authority is provided with 
an undeniable foundation, even though it could still be subjected 
potentially to disrespect and dishonour through the ongoing human 
behaviours that have eroded the traditional/conventional foundation 
of the office during the 1990s. 
 
Council bickering (or at least media reporting of this) has and is 
influencing public opinion on local government and disillusionment 
about local leadership. It is my contention that the most prevalent 
council culture is one of leadership challenge (and mayoral leader 
opposition) involving the three principal parties – the mayor, 
councillors, and the CEO.  
 
In the eyes (and minds) of the community, it is the mayor who is 
the primary leader. Therefore it is the mayor who is primarily 
responsible for stopping internecine warfare and upholding council 
harmony (and effective governance), even though the mayor may 
have been divorced from leader authority by his/her colleagues’ 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
intent themselves (collectively and individually) on commandeering 
internal power and control (authority). 
   
Subsequent to my research data gathering, the 2001 elections – 
through the number of mayoral oustings (12) as well as the low 
voter turnout  - reflect DuBrin’s (1995) theory on leadership 
replacement as the antidote to major organisational problems (in the 
hope the newly appointed leader will reverse the performance 
problems) as well as Weber’s theory of political instability and 
charismatic cycles linked to crises and dissatisfaction.   
 
Increasing Expectations and Role Clarity 
I have canvassed the ancient history of the mayoral position. Today 
there are increasing expectations of mayors internationally as the 
new sustainability agenda unfolds, with local governments having a 
major role in mitigating and developing solutions to economic, 
environmental and social problems.  As Ross (2002) says, the role 
of the mayor is already of significance in building a civil society, 
and is likely to be even more so in the future.    
 
In New Zealand all communities have had mayors since the 1989 
local government reforms, which replaced county councils – and 
their internally elected chairpeople – with district councils and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
directly elected mayors.  The empirical evidence presented in this 
research illustrates the significance of the community leadership 
role expected of the nation’s mayors today, as well as the 
robustness of their operating environments. This is as it is. 
Conversely, there has been a failure to properly and fully 
acknowledge - in policy - the responsibilities and functions now 
associated with their office, yet clarity of role has emerged as a key 
issue.  
 
The motivation for silence on the role of the mayor in the 1989 
local government reform legislation was founded in traditional and 
anticipated normative behaviour -that respect for the office would 
allow the incumbent to govern in an appropriate fashion.  Statutory 
processes involving the role of the chief executive and the 
development of Annual Plans with community consultation 
provided a ‘routinised’ framework – Max Weber’s term - linking 
political and bureaucratic leadership with service to citizens and the 
future.  In Rodney, the framework broke down: the council – or 
more specifically some individuals within the council – lost sight of 
service. The incumbent mayor was anaesthetised, became disabled. 
The sacking of the dysfunctional District Council – a Ministerial 
power used for the first time in New Zealand – was a consequence 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
of a breakdown in human relationships within the council, and had 
an undercurrent relating to the role of the mayor (and the CEO).   
 
The comments of Stigley, media representatives, and the mayors 
themselves, acknowledge that disharmony and political disturbance 
punctuated local governments way beyond Rodney.  Even earlier, 
the Rangitikei situation prompted concerns about the impact on 
governance.   
 
Local Government Act (2002) 
The 2001-2000 legislative review confirmed the foundation of 
democratic local government, with a new focus on ‘rigorous 
decision-making and accountability processes’. Although the 
review proposed that ‘roles should be allocated, as far as possible to 
avoid conflict’, and ‘powers…should be explicit and consistent 
with the expected role’, the current legislative silence on specific 
roles and responsibilities for elected members is to continue 
because of legislative crafting difficulties relating to the focus on 
good governance as an outcome.  
 
The new 2002 Act’s requirement for Local Governance Statements 
– to include members’ roles and conduct, governance structures and 
processes – provides no rational-legal authority for mayors, and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
thus leaves the mayoral office and functions to be defined by the 
majority vote of local councillors, a definition which may or may 
not reflect community expectations of the role.  Locally defined 
role profiles are already in existence (e.g. Hamilton - initially 
developed by the city council in 1995), and have not provided 
‘legitimised authority’, or proven to be effective tools to counter 
disharmony (Hamilton City Council, October 1995, Role Profiles, 
Committee Structure, Roles and Responsibilities).  
 
International Precedents 
There are international precedents for legislative role prescription 
relevant to the New Zealand situation. As examples, in London and 
Honolulu the mayors have both specified and general powers and 
duties, with overall strategic responsibilities to govern, setting 
visions and allocating funding. The councils have scrutiny roles and 
procedures and in London the terms ‘keeping a check on the mayor’ 
and ‘holding the mayor to account’ are used. Accountability 
mechanisms are both structural and process-based through 
separation of powers and requirements to consult.  In London, the 
separation is between the mayor and the assembly; in Honolulu it is 
the executive (the mayor) and the legislative branch  (the council).   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
The Honolulu council and the mayoral office rest on the 
constitutional framework of home rule which enables local 
governments to develop territory-specific local government charters 
or local laws setting out their political structure, roles and 
responsibilities, with requirements for regular reviews based on 
consultative processes – similar to the Local Governance 
Statements proposed for New Zealand. Standards of conduct - for 
both elected officials and staff - are governed by charter provisions 
which emphasise expectations of ‘the highest standards of ethical 
conduct, to the end that the public may justifiably have trust and 
confidence in the integrity of government’, and that recognises ‘the 
public interest is their primary concern.’ There are also provisions 
to impeach the mayor and council members based on ‘malfeasance, 
misfeasance, or non-feasance in office’ – colloquially translated as 
‘evil-doing, wrongful exercise of lawful authority, or in-action’ – 
involving a voter petition and Supreme Court consideration.  
 
There is similarity with Brisbane’s charter-like constitution through 
the City of Brisbane Act (1924-87), which sets out the mayor’s role  
(Section 23A). In Brisbane there is no ‘separation of powers’ 
implicit in the division of the office of mayor from the council in 
the other international examples.  The Mayor of Brisbane is the 
council chairperson and a council member as in New Zealand local 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
government. The City of Brisbane Act empowers the council to 
appoint the deputy mayor and the town clerk (Section 23A) but 
tradition provides for the mayor to recommend a nomination. Under 
Local Law – Ordinance 18 – it is the council who appoints 
committee chairpeople and committee members.  Brisbane Mayor 
Jim Soorley has both statutory and political authority – legislative 
authority ‘to formulate general policies’, ordinance authority to 
chair the council’s principle committee, and political clout built up 
over four terms which encourages councillors to support his choice 
of council ‘sub leaders’.  
 
Elwood’s (2001) fundamental determinant of the mayor (the ‘nature 
of the person’) can be applied to the international situation, but the 
principle difference in the New Zealand situation is the lack of 
clarity in law.  
 
Common Views 
The views of the 1998-2001 mayors gathered through the research 
questionnaire reflected those of the Class of 1995-98 as recorded in 
the notes of the 1997 Hamilton Mayors’ Forum, indicating 
continuing concerns and a trend of on-going consensus.  The key 
1997 themes relevant to the 2001 situation included the detailed and 
wide-ranging description of the ‘newly emerging’ role of the 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
mayor, reference to ‘managing conflict’, and the call for ‘statutory 
reference’ to provide solid foundation and ‘reduce politics’.    
 
Farkas and Wetlaufer (1996) are among those who argue that the 
situation is the key influencing factor for leaders.  Leadership is 
driven not so much by ‘what someone is like inside, but what the 
outside demands’ (Farkas and Wetlaufer, 1996, pp 144-146). In my 
research, community leadership, political leadership and policy 
leadership were among the ‘outside demands’ - significant roles 
(and responsibilities), and important for effective governance and 
accountability. The mayors reported high community expectations 
that they would ‘give a strong lead on a wide range of issues and 
particularly the big issues’, and that their ability to deliver results 
depended on their team-building skills within their councils.  But 
the internal drivers for leadership execution (my focus) included the 
quality of the relationship with the council’s chief executive officer, 
goodwill from a majority of councillors, and their council’s 
acceptance of the role of the mayor. Almost one in four scored 
council disharmony and conflict, and ‘politicking’ as significant 
factors, and one in five the influence of ‘difficult’ councillors.    
  
I repeat the advice of Mileham and Spacie (1996) who 
acknowledge ‘problem people’, and conclude that unclear roles are 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
the single greatest cause of stress and authority-loss: “If there is any 
room for doubt, seek clarification” (p 140). Brosnahan (1999), who 
acknowledges the situational impact on leadership, also calls for 
clear definition of leadership responsibility.  Further, legislative 
clarity is also currently recommended for Tertiary Education 
Institution (TEI) councils and their chairpeople, in a May 2003 
report requested by the Associate Minister of Education (Tertiary 
Education). In this report, Edwards outlines an integrated package 
of measures to provide a ‘framework for more effective 
governance’ which shares common elements and issues with the 
model I am advocating for local government - in particular 
provisions for ‘Council Chairs’ (Edwards, May 2003, Review of 
New Zealand Tertiary Education Institution Governance, p 35-46).   
 
My study is an attempt to balance the ideal with the real. 
Legislative crafting difficulty is not an understandable reason for 
inaction.  There are numerous international examples of mayoral 
role specification.  In addition, the 1989 provision for Chief 
Executives provides a New Zealand model.  Equivalent provisions 
could be developed for mayors, and other council members.   
 
Edwards’ TEI model, as I have said, is a further specific example, 
and important because it addresses the issue of ‘council leadership’ 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
and its ‘disempowerment’, ‘dominant chief executives’, risks to 
institutional performance, and mechanisms to deal with breaches of 
duty.      
 
Legislative Proposals 
The political environment is inherently unstable without an agreed 
foundation of established roles, responsibilities, functions and rule 
following. Disharmony and political disturbance can result in 
ineffective governance and dysfunction.  The scales of balance 
require the further weighting of legislated leadership, but with 
improved accountabilities to discourage omnivorous mayors, and a 
nationally prescribed Code of Conduct to discourage uncivil 
councillors. My definition of the mayoral leadership roles and 
functions (outlined in Chapter 3) provides a framework.   
 
My thesis is that the following four inter-related matters should be 
taken into account by government in the framing of new local 
government legislation, and should be advocated by Local 
Government New Zealand and its member local governments: 
 
1.  Statutory Clarification of Roles 
Local government law should include a definition of the mayor’s 
role of mayor as both council and community leader.  This would 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
reflect the two ‘critical’ relationships referred to in the June 2001 
Review Consultation Document – with the local community and 
with the chief executive and the organisation.  The responsibilities 
of the mayor should include both a governance and policy 
leadership role – again to reflect the review description of 
governance.   
 
In addition, the mayor’s current statutory role as presiding member 
of council should be clarified.  It is concluded that the mayor, and 
only the mayor may delegate this presiding member function.   This 
would require a new provision in the law and would give the right 
to the mayor to appoint his or her deputy and committee 
chairpeople to give them the delegated authority to act on behalf of 
the mayor (in the case of the deputy mayor) and to act as presiding 
members at committee level (in the case of committee chairpeople).   
The mayor could delegate this authority to the council, and a wise 
mayor would follow an inclusive and consultative process if 
executing the authority personally.  Further, the mayor should be 
required to recommend for council approval, and in liaison with the 
chief executive, the political structure of the council. 
 
Section 28 (LG Bill 2001) is a redraft of the 1989 provisions 
relating to the appointment, role and responsibilities of chief 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
executives, as “the principle administrative officer of the local 
authority” (28.4.)  I note particularly the “responsibility” to the 
local authority for “providing leadership” for the staff.  And the 
requirements set out in clauses 44 and 45 relating to directors of 
council-controlled organisations, including their “role” – also 
requiring ‘leadership’. 
 
A mirror clause (to the CEO s 28, pp 24-25) could be developed 
relating to the role and responsibilities of mayors, reflecting their 
leadership roles both within their councils, and representing their 
communities.  Further provision could relate to the chairs of 
regional councils, and to councillors of both territorial and regional 
councils.  My focus however is on mayors: 
 
Moulding elements from the international examples previously 
outlined, together with good practice based on scholarly 
observations and practitioner experience, I have drafted a proposed 
clause, to address the acknowledged silence in New Zealand law, 
and finish McKinlay’s business.  This proposal reflects the local 
government principles relating to community partnerships, role 
allocation to avoid conflict, and definition of explicit consistent 
powers: 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
-  Recommended New Clause  - ‘Mayor’   
The following is the recommended new clause entitled ‘Mayor’: 
1. The mayor is the elected leader of the community and council, 
in accordance with section 27(2) – (reiterating the definition in the 
Interpretation Section (5) (p 12). 
 
2.      The mayor is responsible to the local community for- 
a. Providing leadership to the local community in accordance 
with the purposes outlined in Part 1, clauses 3 (– relating to the 
Purposes of local government); 
b. Providing leadership to the local authority and its council 
members; 
c. Ensuring citizens and the local community participate in the 
decision-making processes of the local authority and have access to 
his or her office, council members and the local authority; 
d. Appointing, with the local authority council members, the 
chief executive in accordance with clauses 32 and 33 of Schedule 5; 
e. Ensuring the effective and efficient governance and 
management of the local authority in accordance with clauses 23, 
24 and 25 (- Governance and Management principles). 
 
3.      The mayor is responsible to his or her council for- 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
a. Ensuring that the public interest is the primary concern of the 
local authority; 
b. Ensuring the development of the highest standards of ethical 
conduct, to the end that the public may justifiably have trust and 
confidence in the integrity of their local government 
c. Monitoring the performance of the chief executive, with 
council members; 
d. Ensuring that the local authority prepares key statutory, policy 
and planning documents, in accordance with clauses 13, 14, 25, 16, 
75, 76, 78 (-includes Triennial Agreements, Local Governance 
Statements, Long Term Plans, Annual Plans and Annual Reports). 
 
4. The mayor shall: 
 
a. Be the presiding member of the council, and 
b. Have the sole right to delegate the presiding member’s 
function, role and responsibilities; 
c. Recommend a council member for appointment as the deputy 
mayor, for approval by council members; 
d. Recommend the governance structures and processes, 
membership, and delegations, for approval by council members; 
e. Be a member ex officio of each committee appointed from 
among the councillors of the council; 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
f. Be responsible to the council for the control of the working 
and business of that local authority and for ensuring the chief 
executive implements policies adopted by the council; 
g.     Have power to formulate general policies concerning the 
government of the city; 
g. Ensure that advice is provided by the chief executive to 
members of the local authority. 
 
 
5.    For the purpose of any other Act, a mayor is the elected leader 
of the community and the council. 
 
Since the chief executive is the sole employer of council staff, it is 
recommended that there be an additional provision relating to the 
resourcing of the mayor and council members – after clause 28.2.a.:    
 
- Recommended Additional Clause - Chief executive:   
b.  Ensuring, in liaison with the mayor, the office of the mayor is 
appropriately resourced. 
 
This would counter the current anomaly where mayors – in law - 
are not able to insist on secretarial services, office support, research 
facilities, even information and communication resources.  I note 
that a quality relationship with the chief executive usually results in 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
this area being accommodated.  Edwards’ (2003) TEI council 
model goes further - recommending provision for a secretary 
answerable ‘only to the governing body for council business’, with 
direct reporting to the chairperson, and ‘sufficiently qualified to 
provide independent advisory functions to the Chair and the wider 
Council’ (p 45).  
 
2.  Role Control Mechanisms 
To ensure effective accountability, further mayoral role control and 
scrutiny mechanisms require consideration. The requirement for 
council Annual Reports could be extended to include three-yearly 
mayoral Term Reports plus periodic performance and activity 
reports.   In addition the US and UK provisions for council and 
public Question Time provide both councillors and the community 
with regular and formal opportunities to question the mayor.  
Although the New Zealand experience of Parliamentary Question 
Time is far from convincing, there is potential in the local 
government environment to provide a strong and on-going public 
accountability mechanism to scrutinize the functioning of the 
mayoral office.   
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
3.  Power of General Competence & Local Governance Statements 
The proposed power of general competence will enable local 
governments to choose the activities they undertake and how they 
undertake them, subject to consultative processes.   The aim is 
“scope for different communities to identify their own priorities, 
and to develop and pursue different visions for their futures” (June 
2001 Review Consultation Document, p 14).       
 
However, it is the new LGS (Local Governance Statement) - with 
12 requirements for inclusion (s 26, pp 23-24) – that is more related 
to my research, through its potential as a comprehensive process 
tool aimed at ensuring individuals councils take charge of their own 
operating environments, and for developing the interface with their 
communities.  The weakness is the reliance on statutory 
‘governance principles’ (s24-25, pp 22-23) as the alternative to 
statutorily prescribed roles and responsibilities (June Consultation 
Document, p 32), and the loneliness of the mayor in that process 
through the failure to clarify the leadership role of their office.   
 
Ideal expectations of all elected members are established through 
the insistence that:  
 Elected members be responsible and democratically 
accountable in their decision-making (s24 a),   
  
                              
 
                                                                   
 The governance role and expected conduct of elected 
members is clear and understood by elected members and the 
community (s24 b), and  
 The relationship between elected members and management 
… is effective and understood (s24 f).  
 
Yet the mayor - as council and community leader – is provided with 
no specified responsibility or accountability for these expectations.  
Thus the outcomes would continue to depend on human behaviours, 
and the willingness of all elected members to act in accordance with 
these principles.   
 
Furthermore, the provisions in Section 26 c. and d. requiring the 
inclusion in the LGS of members’ roles and conduct, governance 
structures and processes, membership and delegations, places the 
prescription of the role of the mayor into the individual council’s 
hands, and their majority vote, pitting the ideal against the ‘herding 
cats’ and ‘massed cockfights’ reality.   
 
The Bill (and the Act, 2002) requires the proposed LGS to be 
publicly available, but does not open the door to a public 
submission process, and does not define community accountability.  
This reflects the current primus inter pares status of the mayor, and 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
enables the council rather than the electors to determine what they 
want of their mayor. This situation exposes the mayoral office to 
internal politics and the inherent instability of the common political 
climate with its tensions and self-serving interests.   
 
This is far from the clarification sought by so many, and rather than 
enabling mayors, the finishing of the business in this manner places 
an even greater call on the personal characteristics and skills of 
individual mayors to win the appropriate recognition of their office 
and its function to lead.  Even then, the lame duck is an inevitable 
result in those districts where councillor opposition to mayoral 
leadership wins internal majority support, regardless of community 
expectations.  Effective governance, like democracy and 
civilization, may be the overall objective, but the risk remains 
unacceptably high for disharmony and dysfunctionalism to be the 
political product.  
 
Building on contemporary experience, I therefore propose that 
process and structure be brought together through the development 
of LGSs as local home rule charters, incorporating a statutory 
provision relating to the job description of the mayor as previously 
discussed, and outlining the council functions in accordance with 
the power of general competence - these charters to provide a 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
foundation for each three-year term of office. The charters of 
United States’ cities provide useful models.   
 
Each charter would be developed through a consultative process, 
reviewed three-yearly - and include the local government’s political 
structure and processes including role and responsibility profiles for 
the mayor and councillors based on the statutory provisions, 
standing orders and the council’s code of conduct, role control and 
scrutiny procedures.  It should also include reference to the 
remuneration and support resources for the mayor and councillors, 
including staff resources for the office of the mayor, and the power 
to engage independent advise in specified circumstances such as the 
monitoring of the chief executive’s contract and for internal audit.   
 
4.  Code of Conduct 
Although the proposed development of a Code of Conduct reflects 
initiatives already underway in many New Zealand local 
governments, the Codes will prove effective only if the rules 
governing individual behaviour are formally and clearly set out, and 
with remedies, sanctions and penalties.  The national model could 
allow some discretion for local application, but not on the question 
of individual behaviour.  The United States model of Honolulu - 
which includes provision for councillors to be suspended for three 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
months with loss of pay, and with referral to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts system in some specified circumstances – is one example 
that should be assessed for relevant application to the New Zealand 
situation. 
 
To Conclude   
I conclude that mayoral leadership legitimisation in today’s 
circumstance depends too strongly on personality and situation, in 
the absence of rational-legal authority. Weber’s authority 
justification/obedience mix – necessary to achieve influence – may 
be widely accepted in the local community, but can fail to 
materialise within the council, not because the mayor lacks ability 
(personal) but because his/her peers’ motives, interests and 
behaviours are of the self-seeking and opposing variety rather than 
team-playing and supportive of the primary elected leader. 
Traditional authority once aligned to the Office of Mayor has been 
overthrown. 
 
Chief executives have been recognized statutorily.  It is not enough 
for democracy, or for the future, that mayors should be bereft of a 
solid foundation and left to develop a personal leadership role in a 
‘cat herding’ exercise.  It is a commonsense approach to line up 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
contemporary practice, to move the weight further towards the 
ideal, and to encourage a more positive future. 
 
My thesis proposes a statutory mayoral mirror to the 1989 CEO 
provisions, one that recognises the dual community/council 
leadership functions and their complexity, the importance of the 
mayor/CEO interface and the impact of conflict, and awareness of 
the new role of local government (and mayors).  Such policy 
specificity, together with strengthened local government Codes of 
Conduct and improved scrutiny provisions – both council and 
community-based – would strengthen local governance and 
leadership, and allow local solutions to local problems within a 
national framework.  Local charters could provide the vehicle.  This 
will make a difference in a less than ideal world where ‘poison’ and 
‘poisoners’ (Gibbons, 1997) will continue to find their way into the 
City Halls of the nation, and while the quest for ‘civil-isation’ and 
peaceful co-existence continues.  
 
The business remains unfinished. 
 
Further Matters 
Earlier in this report I referred to the issues of CEO authority and 
gender influences on mayoral authority as worthy of further 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
research.  There were two more questions to emerge from my 
investigation - relating to regional council chairpeople and 
mandatory voting for local government elections. 
 
1. A number of the mayors suggested there should be a review 
and public debate encouraged on the current regional council 
provision for council elected chairperson - although the ‘leadership 
power’ that would come with a directly elected regional ‘Lord 
Mayor’ was of concern. The view was that regional chairpeople 
have no public accountability and no community leadership role as 
a direct result of their internal appointment, and that the 
remuneration package is excessive in comparison with that of 
mayors.  There was continuing discomfort with the 1989 
territorial/regional council split, and some speculation at the time of 
my survey that the 2002 Act could extend the functions and powers 
of regional government as has been borne out.  To the mayors, this 
made the concept of change to direct election of regional 
chairpeople even more relevant, because of the increased 
community accountability.   
 
2. Mayors were concerned at the drop-off in voter participation 
in local government elections. There would be democratic value in 
encouraging public debate on the merits of compulsory voting.  The 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
City of Brisbane example – with a consistent 95 percent turnout - is 
worthy of further study.  Sweeting (2002) points out that low 
participation in UK local government elections (below 30 per cent 
in 1998 and 1999) ‘calls into question the legitimacy of local 
councils’ (p 10).  
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
APENDICES 
 
1.  Questionnaire Participants by City and District Councils 
1. Ashburton – Mayor R. Murray Anderson 
2. Carterton – Mayor Martin Tankersley     
3. Central Hawkes Bay – Mayor Hamish Kynoch      
4. Central Otago – Mayor Bill McIntosh    
5. Far North – Mayor Yvonne Sharp       
6. Gisborne – Mayor John Clarke      
7. Hamilton – Mayor Russ Rimmington      
8. Hastings – Mayor Jeremy Dwyer       
9. Hauraki – Mayor Basil Morrison  
10. Hurunui – Mayor John Chaffey      
11. Invercargill – Mayor Tim Shadbolt     
12. Kaikoura – Mayor J R Abernethy       
13. Kaipara – Mayor Graeme Ramsey    
14. Kapiti Coast – Mayor Irde McCloy      
15. Manawatu  - Mayor Audrey Severinsen      
16. Marlborough – Mayor Gerald Hope     
17. Masterton – Mayor Bob Francis       
18. Matamata-Piako – Mayor Hugh Vercoe  
19. New Plymouth – Mayor Claire Stewart     
20. North Shore – Mayor George Wood     
21. Opotiki – Mayor Don Riesterer 
22. Otorohanga – Mayor Eric Tait      
23. Palmerston North – Mayor Jill White     
24. Porirua – Mayor Jenny Brash        
25. Queenstown Lakes - Mayor Warren Cooper         
26. Rangitikei – Mayor John Vickers      
27. Rodney – Mayor John Law  
28. -               Former Mayor Doug Armstrong 
29. Rotorua - Mayor Grahame Hall 
30. Ruapehu – Mayor Weston Kirton      
31. Selwyn – Mayor Michael McEvedy    
32. South Waikato – Mayor Gordon Blake    
33. Stratford – Mayor B R Jeffares     
34. Tararua – Mayor Maureen Reynolds    
35. Taupo – Mayor Joan Williamson 
36. Tauranga – Mayor Noel Pope 
37. Timaru – Mayor Wynne Raymond     
38. Waikato – Mayor Angus Macdonald 
39. Waipa – Mayor John Hewitt 
40. Waitakere – Mayor Bob Harvey 
41. Waitaki – Mayor Duncan Taylor         
42. Waitomo – Mayor Steve Parry 
43. Wanganui – Mayor Chas Poynter     
44. Western Bay of Plenty – Mayor Maureen Anderson 
45. Whakatane – Mayor Colin Hammond    
 
 
  
                              
 
                                                                   
2.   North Island map  
  
                              
 
                                                                   
5. South Island map 
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